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SECRECY AND REAL PROPERTY
Dale A. Whitman*
It is not unusual for owners of real property to wish to conceal from
government or the public either the fact of their ownership or certain
salient characteristics of the property they hold. The objective of this
article is to consider the extent to which this desire for secrecy is sup-
ported by sound policy and American legal doctrine. It will focus on the
civil recourse available to an owner of real property against private per-
sons who, without the owner's knowledge and consent, reveal informa-
tion about the ownership or physical characteristics of the property. The
article will also consider whether the law does or should affirmatively
compel disclosure of such facts by an owner.
I. THE OWNER'S DESIRE FOR SECRECY:
MOTIVATONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATONS
A. Owner's Motivations
Owners may seek to conceal many of the characteristics of land and its
ownership because of the repercussions that could result from their dis-
closure. Perhaps the fact about realty most frequently sought to be con-
cealed is the identity of the owner himself. Often, identification of the
owner would bring some measure of obloquy upon him 1 or would prove
embarrassing. 2 The owner might be a celebrity, politician, or have other
"image" problems that would be accentuated by ownership of certain
types of real estate. Such persons, as well as the ill or elderly, might well
fear importuning from disgruntled tenants or customers at inconvenient
times and places. 3 The owner of property also may have reason to hide
*Assoc. Dean & Professor of Law, University of Washington (written while a professor of law
at BYU). BE.S.. 1963, Brigham Young University; LL.B., 1966, Duke University.
1. As an example, consider ownership of slum properties that contain numerous housing code
violations.
2. An example of a potentially embarrassing use of property would be the rental of it for use as
an *'adult" theatre, pornographic bookstore, or similar purposes that are either illegal or offend the
mores of the community.
3. Such fears would not be irrational in the light of increasing militancy among residential
tenants. See generally Indritz, The Tenant's Rights Movement. I N.M.L. Rev. 1 (1971); Note,
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his ownership when adverse public reaction could result in harm to the
property rather than to himself. Thus, the property's rental value might
be reduced if it were known widely that its owner was involved with
organized crime 4 or was a sheik from one of the OPEC nations. 5  Con-
versely, public knowledge that a single developer was assembling numer-
ous land parcels to build a major project might greatly inflate the prices
Tenant Unions: Their Law and Operation in the State and Nation, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 79, 96-97
(1970). See also Hibbs v. Neighborhood Organization to Rejuvenate Tenant Housing, 433 Pa. 578.
252 A.2d 622 (1969), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the tenants' picketing of a
landlord's personal residence was permissible in light of the "secretive manner" in which the land-
lord did business. The court stated, "[W]hen a landlord conducts his business in a manner to avoid
detection and not at a regular place of business, informational picketing may not be enjoined for the
sole reason that tenants and others resorted to picketing the landlord's home." 252 A.2d at 624. The
Hibbs case was discussed in 1971 URB. L. ANN. 223, in which the author praised the decision for
recognizing that many "slumlords" absent themselves from a jurisdiction where they rent housing in
order to avoid hearing complaints, being served with housing authority orders, and detection gener-
ally. Residential picketing provides an effective means of publicizing these practices of slum land-
lords. Id. at 226-27.
Purchasers of tract homes or condominium units have also been increasingly inclined in recent
years to picket the developer's unsold units or projects as a means of creating pressure for correction
of construction defects. At least two courts have refused to enjoin such activity. Pebble Brook, Inc.
v. Smith, 140 N.J. Super. 273, 356 A.2d 48 (1976); Plainview Realty, Inc. v. Board of Managers
86 Misc. 2d 515, 383 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Sup. Ct. 1976); cf. West Willow Realty Corp. v. Taylor, 23
Misc. 2d 867, 198 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (granting an injunction on the ground that there
was insufficient evidence of an identity between the picketed developer and the demonstrator's ven-
dor). The favorable attitude toward "consumer picketing" in these cases is traceable, at least in part,
to the first amendment protection extended by the U.S. Supreme Court to persons who distributed
leaflets at a real estate broker's church, at a shopping center in the suburb where he lived, and at the
doors of his neighbors, charging him with racial discrimination and "block-busting." Organization
for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971). The Court in Keefe observed that "respondent
[was] not attempting to stop the flow of information into his own household, but to the public," id.
at 421, and stated that the flow of information to the public was deserving of constitutional protection
"even where [the] expressions were intended to exercise a coercive impact on respondent." Id. at
420. See Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 227 (1975).
More recently the attention of tenant groups seems to have focused on legislation, see Note,
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act: New Hope for the Beleaguered Tenant?, 48 ST. JOHNS
L. REV. 546 (1974); and litigation, see Note, New Judicial Approaches to Maintaining Housing
Quality in the Cities, 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 403 (1976), but the possibility of direct tenant action
remains.
4. The impact on property values of such knowledge is hard to estimate. It seems to have had
little effect, for example, in Las Vegas. See e.g., Veho, The Underworld's Back Door to Las Vegas,
Reader's Digest, Nov. 1974, at 207.
5. Foreign (especially Arab) ownership of United States real estate has become a matter of
increasing national concern. See Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-479, 88
Stat. 1450 (1974), discussed in Note, Foreign Direct Investment in United States Real Estate:
Xenophobic or Principled Reaction?, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 491 (1976). The report to Congress
required by the Act is U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES (1976). See 8 id., apps. L-M, which deal with real estate. See also International
Investment Survey Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1976); U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN U.S. REAL ESTATE (1976).
[Vol. 27:251
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that the remaining owners would demand after the buyer's identity be-
came known. 6
Under the recording acts of American jurisdictions, it is essential that
some recorded document disclose the identity of a record owner for each
privately owned parcel of land. Otherwise, the owner is subject to a seri-
ous risk that the previous owner will make adverse conveyances or mort-
gages to bona fide purchasers, thus jeopardizing the current owner's ti-
tIle.' This is not to say that the records must disclose the owner's "real"
identity; on the contrary, the record owner may be a corporation, trust, or
other artificial entity subject to the full control of the beneficial owner,
but with no document on the public record indicating the relationship.
This technique has been developed most completely in Cook County,
Illinois, where the "land trust" is widely used to hold real estate for
undisclosed beneficial owners. 8 The potential for abuse is great. One
writer has observed that "in the case of land trusts it appears that the
secrecy aspects have heavily encouraged impropriety." 9
It does not follow that every use of an artificial entity as an ownership
tool has a clandestine motivation. The intermediate entity often is used
merely for convenience in conveyancing,1" to avoid usury statutes" or
6. A classic illustration is the assembly of land for the new town of Columbia, Maryland, by
James Rouse during the early 1960's. Rouse employed a variety of undisclosed agents to purchase
the land, but even so, the prices paid for the last parcels acquired were far above those of the early
parcels. Aggregate land costs would clearly have been much higher in the absence of secrecy. See G.
BRECKENFELD, COLUMBIA AND THE NEW CITIES (1971).
7. See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.3 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); L. SIMES, A HAND-
BOOK FOR MORE EFFICIENT CONVEYANCING 18 (1963).
8. The land trust is a common law device that allows an owner of land to transfer it to a
trustee, who then becomes the holder of both the legal and equitable titles for the benefit of the
named beneficiary. It has been estimated that nearly 80% of the land parcels in Cook County, Illinois
have been or are currently held under land trusts. See Note, Land Trust Secrecy-Perhaps a Secret
No More, 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 509, 510-11 (1973); Feature, The Illinois Land Trust-Shroud with
a Silver Lining?, 5 Loy. CHI. L.J. 412, 413 n.ll (1974).
The device has not yet been employed on a large scale throughout the nation, but at least four
other states have enacted statutes that appear to be aimed at approving the Illinois Land Trust con-
cept, and its use has been recommended by commentators in several additional states. See Birnbaum
& Monahan, The Nominee Trust in Massachusetts Real Estate Practice, 60 MASS. L.Q. 364 (1976);
DeWitt, The Illinois Land Trust-Its Undeveloped Potential in California, 41 L.A.B. BULL. 20
(1965); Comment, A Device for Texas Land Development: The Illinois Land Trust, 10 Hous. L.
REV. 692 (1973).
9. Note, Land Trust Secrecy-Perhaps a Secret No More, 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 509 (1973).
One major problem in Illinois has been that slumlords have succeeded in concealing their identities
and thus have escaped notoriety for their various abuses of minorities who must live in their build-
ings. Statutes passed to compel disclosure of the beneficiaries in the event of building code violations
have proved ineffective in solving the problem. Id. at 510-11.
10. Conveyancing is easier when the property is held in trust. The signatures of multiple owners
need not be obtained; the death or incompetence of an individual owner does not cloud the title; and
19781
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judgment liens, 2 to exclude personal liability on a mortgage loan, or to
accomplish some tax objective. 13 Nevertheless, the device may also be
used for less legitimate reasons, and at least some of these-avoidance
of fines and penalties, for example-may depend on secrecy. 14  In such
cases the owner's objective may be to conceal his identity from both the
general public and the specific governmental officials who have responsi-
bility for enforcing the law he seeks to avoid. To the extent that secrecy
is a factor, these arrangements are our present concern.
In many cases the owner of land desires secrecy, not about his own
identity but about the characteristics of the land or the improvements on
it. Most often this desire is closely tied to the owner's plans to market
the property and is directly affected by the importance, which is usually
negative, that he anticipates the market will attach to the facts in question
if they become known. Obviously, the seller or landlord of a house with
a defective furnace, roof, or other physical problems or code violations
may prefer not to disclose such conditions to prospective buyers or ten-
ants, or even to a real estate broker with whom he lists the property.
Similarly, land located in a mineral-rich area may contain no valuable
mineral deposits, but only an unusually candid vendor would be likely to
advertise the fact. Both developing rules of implied warranty 15 and the
partition is not available. See Feature, The Illinois Land Trust-A Shroud with a Silver Lining?. 5
Loy. CHI. L.J. 412, 415-19 (1974).
S1. Corporate borrowers are exempt from usury protection in some states even if the corporation
was formed exclusively for the purpose of usury statute evasion. See Hershman. Usury and the Tight
Mortgage Market Revisited, 24 Bus. LAW. 1121. 1132-34 (1969).
12. A judgment is a lien on the defendant's real property, but it does not extend to his interests
in land trusts under Illinois law. See Turner, Some Legal Aspects of Beneficial Interests Under
Illinois Land Trusts, 29 ILL. L. REV. 216, 219 (1945).
13. In general, courts have been willing to "look through" shell corporations and other entities
and attribute ownership to their shareholders or beneficiaries. Often this is precisely the result desired
by the taxpayer, particularly when the property is generating substantial income tax deductions. Sec
Riess, Planning for the Use of Nominee Corporations in Real Estate Transactions, 25 TU L TAX
INST. 11 (1975); Wright, Owning Real Estate Through Shams and Nominees, 6 REAL EST. REV. 53
(1976).
14. Owners of rental housing containing substantial code violations sometimes use sham inter-
mediary owners to avoid code enforcement proceedings and resultant fines. See Gribetz & Grad.
Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1254, 1277-78 n.108
(1966); Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801, 813-14 (19651.
Cf. Garrett, Legal Aspects of Land Trusts, 35 CHI. B. REC. 445, 453-54 (1954).
15. Increasingly, courts are holding builders of new housing liable for defective design or con-
struction. See Note, Lender-Vendor's Liability for Structural Defects in New Housing, 53 DEN. L.J.
413 (1976); Note, Extension of Implied Warranties to Developer-Vendors of Completed New Homes.
11 URB. L. ANN. 257 (1976). These holdings have rarely been applied to "existing" housing or to
nonresidential properties, although the Uniform Land Transactions Act would do so to some extent.
See UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2-309.
254 [Vol. 27:251
HeinOnline  -- 27 Am. U. L. Rev. 254 1977-1978
SECRECY & REAL PROPERTY
tort law of fraud and fraudulent concealment 16 deal with these problems
to some extent, but their coverage is spotty and limited; in many situa-
tions the vendor is reasonably safe from liability if he merely says noth-
ing.1 7
B. Public Policy Considerations That
Militate Against Secrecy
Although the desires of landowners for secrecy are often understand-
able, they must be evaluated in the light of the countervailing interests of
government and the public in disclosure. On balance, these interests mili-
tate against total secrecy.
1. The need for aggregated data
The collection, assembly, and dissemination of data about the function-
ing of societal institutions is an important role of government in a com-
plex, technologically oriented nation such as ours. Such data are essential
to governmental decisionmakers and to voters as they resolve public is-
sues. In many cases the data involved are closely associated with the
ownership, use, or physical characteristics of real property. Although in-
dividual parcels usually would not be listed in the published version of
these data, the concealment efforts of private owners could well obstruct
their collection, resulting in inaccuracies and erroneous decisions.
Several types of data that are subject to this problem can be delineated.
The growing wealth of oil-producing nations has caused increasing con-
cern in the United States regarding ownership of American land by
aliens."t To the extent that the nationality of landowners is disguised or
16. See I F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 7.14 (1956); W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS k 106 (4th ed. 1971).
17. The classic view is that mere silence is not actionable, but exceptions are often made if a
confidential or fiduciary relationship exists between the parties, if the vendor makes a partial state-
ment that tends to mislead, or if the transferor has special knowledge or means of knowledge not
available to the transferee. See W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 106. These categories of exceptions
are amorphous and their application is uncertain. See, e.g.. Neff v. Bud Lewis Co., 89 N.M. 145,
548 P.2d 107 (1976). in which the court held a real estate broker liable for his failure to disclose to
buyers of a building defects in the heating and air conditioning system of which he was aware. Cf.
Archuleta v. Kopp. 90 N.M. 273, 562 P.2d 834 (1977), in which a blind purchaser of a home was
alloged to recover for smoke damages caused by his lighting a fire in a nonfunctioning fireplace, on
a theory of innocent misrepresentation or constructive fraud. Id. at 277, 562 P.2d at 838.
18. See I U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 183 (1976); Note, Foreign Direct Investment in United States Real Estate: Xenophobic or
Principled Decision. 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 491, 493 (1976).
During 1972, the largest foreign direct investors in the United States were the Japanese, who with
an investment of $105 million, increased their annual rate of investment five fold over that of 1971.
19781
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concealed, it is impossible for policymakers to make intelligent judg-
ments about whether alien ownership is a problem or to know what types
and locations of land are involved.
The distribution of wealth among American citizens is also a legitimate
matter of public concern. 19 Land is obviously an important element of
national wealth; but, if ownership is secret, it may be impossible to relate
it to other forms of wealth and to draw conclusions about the aggregate
distribution. Knowledge about the relationship of land ownership to other
demographic characteristics, such as race or sex, may be helpful to public
decisionmaking as well as for the administration of public laws designed
to protect minorities. 20 Again, secrecy can frustrate efforts to collect
such data.
Information about the physical features of land can also be essential to
policymaking. Thus, the extent of dilapidation, structural unsoundness, or
lack of necessary plumbing facilities in housing must be known in order
for governmental officials to attack housing problems sensibly.2 t For
example, a program of housing subsidies premised upon the presence of a
large supply of existing rental housing at quality levels not too far below
code standards could be disastrous if subsidies were injected into a mar-
ket that lacked such housing.2 2  Hence, effective concealment by land-
lords of the true condition of their properties could lead to serious policy
errors.
The current concern about America's indigenous energy sources pro-
vides another example. If landowners conceal or falsify known informa-
The book value of foreign direct investment in the U.S. reached $17.7 billion at the end of 1973. an
increase of 24% over the previous year. This can be compared with a total of only $3.4 billion at the
end of 1950. Id. at 496. See generally note 5 supra.
19. Although data on household income in the United States is abundant, data on wealth or net
worth is surprisingly sparse. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SURVEY OF ECONOMIC OPPOR-
TUNITY (1967).
20. For example, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1970).
prohibits discrimination based on race, religion, national origin or sex in the sale or rental of hous-
ing. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d), which provides for the administration of the Act, states, "The Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development shall (I) make studies with respect to the nature and extent of
discriminatory housing practices. ... Practices which obscure the identity of land owners may
make assessment of the effectiveness of Title VIII more difficult.
21. The absence of satisfactory data concerning housing quality is discussed in U.S. NATIONAL
COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 67-69 (1969). and in HAR-
VARD-M.I.T. JOINT CENTER FOR URBAN STUDIES, AMERICA'S HOUSING NEEDS: 1970-1980,
4-1 to 4-4 (1973). More comprehensive data about housing quality is now becoming available as a
result of the annual housing surveys commenced jointly in 1973 by the Census Bureau and HUD. See
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE-U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ANNUAL
HOUSING SURVEY: 1973, INDICATORS OF HOUSING AND NEIGHBORHOOD QUALITY (1975).
22. See Whitman, Federal Housing Assistance for the Poor: Old Problems and New Directions,
9 URB. LAW 1, 35-36 (1977).
[Vol. 27:251
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tion about oil, gas, coal, or other deposits on their land-whether by
exaggerating or minimizing the size, location, and ease of extraction of
the resources-the public bodies charged with ensuring an adequate fuel
supply could be hampered in their data collection efforts.2 3
2. Law enforcement
In many contexts an owner of land may become personally liable for
fines, taxes, assessments, or even imprisonment as a result of his failure
to carry out duties imposed by law. Concealed ownership handled
through a land trust or other shell may well assist such evasions and
make law enforcement difficult and uneven.2 4 Consider, for example,
Chicago Alderman Thomas Keane, who owned an interest, through a
land trust, in a corporation that obtained a lucrative parking lot contract
with city-owned O'Hare International Airport. The alderman did not re-
veal his interest when he voted to grant the contract.2 5 Statutes in many
jurisdictions would prohibit such actions, 26 but the land trust makes it
much less probable that they will come to light.
Another illustration involved a court-appointed receiver of certain
violation-ridden slum apartment buildings in Chicago. His duty was to
manage the buildings and effect the necessary repairs. Instead, through
various nominees and land trusts, the receiver acquired the mortgagees'
interest in the mortgages on the buildings, caused them to be foreclosed,
and bought the properties at the subsequent foreclosure sales, all in fla-
grant violation of his fiduciary duties .2  Both this case and Keane's deal-
23. See, e.g., Speech of President Carter (Apr. 20, 1977), reprinted in 35 CONG. Q. 751 (Apr.
23, 1977); Smith, Estimating Natural Gas Reserves Thorny Problem for U.S., Wash. Post, Mar. 18,
1977. § A. at 9, col. 1; FEA Lists Higher U.S. Reserves Figures, OIL & GAS J., July 7, 1975, at
32.
24. Housing code violations are a typical illustration; see note 14 supra. Evasion of contractual
obligations may also be facilitated by secrecy, as when a mortgagee transfers his land by assigning
his beneficial interest in a land trust to avoid triggering the accelerated payment clause of the
mortgage. See Flaherty, Illinois Land Trusts and the Due-on-Sale Clause, 65 ILL. B.J. 376 (1977).
25. The alderman's relationships were revealed in a series of newspaper articles. Chicago Sun-
Times, Dec. 10-17, 1973. See also Note, Land Trust Secrecy-Perhaps a Secret No More, 23
DEPAUL L. REV. 509, 511 n.10 (1973). Mr. Keane was subsequently convicted of mail fraud in
connection with another scheme employing land trusts. United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534 (7th
Cir. 1975). cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976).
26. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 3-14-4 (1962), which provides that "[n]o municipal
officer shall be interested, directly or indirectly, in the purchase of any property which (1) belongs to
the municipality, or (2) is sold for taxes or assessments, or (3) is sold by virtue of legal process at
the suit of the municipality." (Emphasis added). See also Note, Fighting Conflicts of Interest in
Officialdom: Constitutional and Practical Guidelines for State Financial Disclosure Laws, 73 MICH.
L. REV. 758 n.4 (1975).
27. City of Chicago v. Hart Bldg. Corp., 116 Ii. App. 2d 39, 253 N.E.2d 496 (1969).
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ings were exposed, but it is easy to imagine other cases on similar facts
in which the culprit is never caught. Although secret ownership devices
are not the root of all evil, they certainly can assist in its perpetration.
3. An informed public
Our discussion thus far has focused on the need for governmental offi-
cials to know the facts about land. In a broader sense, the citizenry also
has a need to know-a need not confined to governmental statistics but
encompassing virtually the whole range of human behavior on land as it
affects neighboring persons. This argument must not be pressed too far,
for there is plainly an appropriate zone of privacy that protects many
land-oriented activities. But with land, perhaps more than with any other
species of property, one's own use affects one's neighbors, generating
both positive and negative externalities. 2 8 This is so primarily because
land is immobile; hence its use produces "neighborhood effects" that are
pervasive and long-lasting. Such a simple matter as painting one's house
or landscaping one's yard can have a great effect, good or bad, on sur-
rounding landowners. Establishing a cattle-feeding operation, a paper
mill, or a house of prostitution may impact on the neighborhood in an
even more obvious manner.
It is not our present purpose to discuss the mechanisms through which
such conflicts can be resolved, but merely to observe that public debate
and press coverage is desirable and helpful, and perhaps even constitu-
tionally protected. The identity of the owner of the land in question may
be quite relevant to that debate; the "marketplace of ideas" envisioned
by the draftsmen of the first amendment 29 is arguably incomplete if the
owner's name is insulated from the political battle. Public reaction may
be altered (and legitimately so) if, for example, it is learned that every
"adult" movie theatre in town is owned by the mayor.
4. Fairness in private transactions
In general, the vendor of real estate has a significant advantage over
the purchaser. He knows the property, usually having possessed and oc-
cupied it for some time. The purchaser is a stranger to the land and often
28. See Fountainbleu Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1959)
(litigation involving a building that cast a shadow on the cabana, swimming pool, and sunbathing
areas of a neighboring hotel); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); W.
SMITH, HOUSING: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ELEMENTS 21-23 (1970).
29. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919). See text accompanying note 84 infra.
[Vol. 27:251
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has only a limited time and meager resources for acquainting himself
with it. Although equality of information about the good to be transferred
is one of the essential ingredients of the classical definition of a competi-
tive market, 30 in reality the vendor usually has the edge. For centuries
the law steadfastly ignored this disparity, myopically enjoining buyers to
beware, whether they had the practical means to do so or not. Only in
the last decade has the weight of American law begun to move toward
protection of purchasers of defective realty, and even today that protec-
tion is often extended only to the most naive purchasers of the most
clearly defective property. 31
Secrecy figures into this equation in two ways: with regard to the
purchaser's opportunity to investigate the quality of the property, and
with regard to his recourse against the vendor after the sale is complete.
The buyer's investigation may be materially aided by information dis-
seminated by government, the press, or merely word of mouth in the
community, but this process will be hindered and made ineffectual to the
extent that land owners are able to keep information about their property
confidential. It can hardly be gainsaid that prospective buyers of "recrea-
tional" land in Florida, land that is in fact under water or inaccessible,
have benefitted by the efforts of the HUD Office of Interstate Land
Sales,3 2 the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 33 and the
press 34 to warn them of the risks. Abuses remain, and the efforts of the
government and the media cannot eliminate all of them. It is clear,
nevertheless, that purchasers are now better informed and more wary than
heretofore.
If the vendor defrauds the purchaser or violates an implied warranty, or
the Interstate Land Sales Act 35 or its state law analogue, civil liability
may result. Nevertheless, practical recourse against the vendor depends
on identifying him, locating him, and serving him with process. If sham
trusts, corporations, or nominees have been employed to effect the sale,
these steps are difficult and the purchaser's chances of recovery become
more remote. There are, of course, other potential barriers to recovery,
30. See M. SPENCER, CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 379-397 (1971); note 82 infra.
31. See note 15 supra.
32. The Office of Interstate Land Sales was created pursuant to Title XIV, Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1976).
33. Id. The Act also provides for the registration of subdivisions, filing of a statement of record,
and civil liabilities for a false statement or an omission of a material fact in the statement of record.
34. See, e.g.. M. PAULSON, THE GREAT LAND HUSTLE (1972); D. TYMON, AMERICA IS
FOR SALE (1973).
35. See notes 32-34 supra. See generally Note, Regulation of Interstate Land Sales, 25 STAN.
L. REV. 605 (1973).
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not the least of which may be the vendor's insolvency. Nonetheless, con-
cealed ownership is likely to aid the vendor in escaping liability for the
injustice he has caused.
Admittedly, the private market in real estate in many ways departs
from the classic competitive market, and no amount of disclosure of in-
formation will make the two coincide completely. It is also true that
disclosure is not cost free and that the expense of developing and publish-
ing the information in question-especially if it is elaborate and must
conform to some government-prescribed format-will ultimately be
shared in some fashion among the parties to each individual transac-
tion. 36 The lack of information, however, is also costly. When transac-
tions are based on fallacious assumptions, the market is less than fully
competitive, and misallocation of resources occurs; in the long run, the
productivity of the nation's economy is harmed. The economic damage
that flows from secrecy is thus both individual and collective. Although it
is hard to quantify this damage, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that,
at least with respect to "recreational" land, it has been substantial. This
conclusion does not argue irresistably in favor of imposing the burden
and cost of disclosure on the vendor, but it strongly suggests that steps in
that direction may be desirable.
II. SANCTIONS FOR DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
CONCERNING REAL PROPERTY
When an owner of real estate desires to keep certain information con-
cerning the property secret, he may be understandably displeased if an
individual undermines his efforts by disclosing or publishing the facts in
question. This section will consider whether such an irate owner has a
private right of action against the discloser. The discussion will focus on
state tort law remedies. If, however, the disclosure is made by a state or
the federal government, the landowner may also derive protection from
specific statutes as well as from the United States Constitution.
A. The Tort of Privacy Invasion
Perhaps the most obvious tort law theory that might be applied to the
disclosure of facts about real estate is the "right of privacy." 37 Unfor-
36. One early estimate placed the cost of registering the typical subdivision under the Interstate
Land Sales Act at $10,000. See Registration Rules Worry Homebuilders, 182 ENGINEERING NEWS
REC. 24 (Apr. 17, 1969).
37. The "right of privacy" was first suggested in the famous article by Warren and Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). See also Kalven, Privacy" in Tort Law-Were
Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 326 (1966).
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tunately, this phrase has been used as a rubric in American courts to
cover at least four disparate types of legal wrongs. Professor Prosser's
formulation 38 has been widely adopted by the courts, and will be fol-
lowed here. In brief, the wrongs he identifies are: (1) appropriation for
the defendant's benefit of the plaintiff's name or likeness, usually for
advertising or other commercial purposes;39 (2) intrusion upon the plain-
tiff's physical solitude or seclusion, as by physical entry, eavesdropping,
or photography in some nonpublic place; 4" (3) public disclosure of pri-
vate facts under circumstances which would be offensive to a reasonable
person and (4) publicity which holds the plaintiff out to the public in a
false light, creating an erroneous impression about his character, behav-
ior, or opinions.42 There is obviously a substantial overlap between the
"false light" cases and actions for defamation, 43 but false light privacy
suits may well be based on laudatory rather than derogatory communica-
tions.44 Of the four types of privacy actions mentioned above, however,
the "false light" theory appears to have the least probable application to
the concerns of this article, since it invariably involves the conveying of
an impression which is nonfactual. Our concern here is with facts, and
the false light theory will not be discussed in further detail. Each of the
other three types of privacy actions, however, may conceivably have ap-
plication to the disclosure of a landowner's secrets about his land.
1. Appropriation
The term "privacy" is frequently a complete misnomer in appropria-
tion cases. Often the plaintiff is a celebrity or well-known personality
38. W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 117. See also Davis, What Do We Mean by "Right to
Privacy"?, 4 S.D.L. REV. 1 (1959).
39. The leading case is Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68
(1905). in which the plaintiff's name, picture, and false testimonial were used without authority in
the defendant's advertising. An interesting recent case is Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Sys-
tems, Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct. 1973), in which the plaintiff, Howard
Hughes' assignee, recovered from the defendant manufacturer of "The Howard Hughes Game."
40. A typical example is Dieteman v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1968), in which
a reporter and photographer gained entry into plaintiff's house on a pretext and surreptitiously re-
corded and photographed him.
41. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr.
866 (1971). in which the defendant magazine disclosed plaintiff's past criminal activity eleven years
after the fact, during which time he had "gone straight."
42. See generally Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093 (1962).
43. Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 35 n.16, 459 P.2d 912, 921 n.16, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 369
n.16 (1969).
44. See Zolich, Laudatory Invasion of Privacy, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 532 (1967).
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who has not the slightest desire to avoid the limelight.4" Rather, the
burden of the complaint is economic: the plaintiff could have sold his
endorsement, picture, or statement to the defendant for commercial use if
the defendant had not "stolen" it. Thus the suit's function is to recover
for the plaintiff the fee that an endorsement or modeling contract would
have produced.
The relevance of the appropriation doctrine to real property is scarcely
obvious. For example, it is usually held that only natural persons can
recover for appropriation of their names or likenesses. 46  Thus, one
whose horse, 47 dog, 48 house, 49 or car is photographed and used for
commercial advertising purposes generally has no ground for recovery. A
comparison of two racing car cases is instructive. In both Branson v.
Fawcett Publications " and Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 51 photographs of the plaintiffs' racers were taken without their con-
sent and were used in advertisements. In neither case was the driver's
face identifiable. Yet the plaintiff failed in Branson and recovered in
Motschenbacher. Motschenbacher's car was painted with a distinctive de-
sign and colors which had come to be identified with him. He was an
experienced professional driver who had given product endorsements in
the past; Branson, by contrast, was a part-time driver whose car's mark-
ings were not particularly distinctive. Thus, Motschenbacher's personal
identity was conveyed by the image of his car in the advertisement, and
in that sense his identity had been appropriated.
45. See, e.g., Uhlaender v. Hendrickson, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970) (use of baseball
players' names in a commercially marketed game); Palmer v. Schonhom Enterprises. Inc.. 96 NJ.
Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (1967) (names of professional golfers Arnold Palmer, Gary Player, Doug
Sanders, and Jack Nicklaus used in defendant's "Pro-Am Golf Game"); Kimborough v. Coca-
Cola/IUSA, 521 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975) (picture of college athlete in advertisement). See
generally Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses and Personal Histories, 51 TEX. L.
REV. 637 (1973); Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d 865 (1969).
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), the Supreme Court held
that the first amendment did not immunize a television station from "appropriation" liability for
broadcasting the performance of a "human cannonball" without his consent.
46. See Shubert v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 Misc. 734, 72 N.Y.S.2d 851, aff'd, 274 App.
Div. 751, 80 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1947).
47. Bayer v. Ralston Purina Co., 484 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. 1972).
48. Lawrence v. Ylla, 184 Misc. 807, 55 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (allowing recovery on
the ground that an implied term of plaintiff's contract with photographer-defendant prohibited his use
of the photographs for other commercial purposes).
49. Rawls v. Conde Nast Publ., Inc., 446 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1971); Rozhon v. Triangle Publ.,
230 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1956). Both of these opinions suggest that the publication would be action-
able if enough of the house had been shown to make it readily identifiable to the public as the
plaintiff's property.
50. 124 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Il. 1954).
51. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
(Vol. 27:251
HeinOnline  -- 27 Am. U. L. Rev. 262 1977-1978
SECRECY & REAL PROPERTY
One can envision similar situations in real estate. The owner of a fa-
mous resort or a house designed by Frank Lloyd Wright may well have
come to be so identified with the property in the public mind that the
publication of the real estate's photograph or name may be the equivalent
of appropriation of its owner's identity. Perhaps even less well-known
real estate may trigger the tort.5 2  In such cases, however, it is clear that
no secrecy is involved. Indeed, it is the pre-existing notoriety of the
plaintiffs ownership of the land that makes the appropriation actionable.
Hence, such appropriation cases are really outside the scope of the pres-
ent inquiry.
2 Intrusion
Intrusion is that branch of the right of privacy that focuses on the way
information is obtained, rather than on the contents disclosed. It is predi-
cated on the view that some types of data-gathering activities are simply
too obnoxious, embarrassing, or offensive to be permitted with impun-
ity. 53  Various forms of electronic and photographic surveillance are ob-
vious candidates for this treatment, particularly when carried out against
or within the plaintiff's residence. 4 Often the defendant's activities are
equally actionable as common law trespass,5 5 so that the principal func-
52. See note 49 supra.
53. See note 40 supra. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 117, at 807-09; Annot., 56
A.L.R.3d 434 (1974).
54. See, e.g., Fowler v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 343 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1965) (liability
can exist for "'tapping" a telephone even when the information obtained is not disclosed to others);
Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1965) (landlord who illegally installed a
listening device in his tenants' bedroom was liable to them even though there was no evidence that
anyone listened or that the information gained by the surveillance was published or communicated to
third persons). Surveillance activities, if carried on by government officers, may also violate the
unreasonable search provision of the fourth amendment. See, e.g., United States v. United States
Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972), which holds that warrantless electronic surveillance of
allegedly subversive domestic organizations is unconstitutional.
If the intrusion occurs in a public place in which the plaintiff has no legal "right to be alone," his
right of privacy is diminished accordingly. Thus, there is no intrusion if while plaintiff is in public,
he is followed and watched, Forster v. Manchester, 410 Pa. 192, 189 A.2d 147 (1963), or if his
picture is taken, Gill v. Hearst Publ. Co. 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953) (plaintiffs in "affec-
tionate pose" in public market place); Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D.
Minn. 1948) (plaintiff photographed in courtroom). Nevertheless, even in a public place, a cause of
action may arise if the intrusion is unreasonable. See, e.g., Pinkerton Nat'l Detective Agency v.
Stevens, 108 Ga. App. 159, 132 S.E.2d 119 (1963) (blatant shadowing by private investigator that
frightened plaintiff and caused public attention to be drawn to her, gave rise to a cause of action).
55. See, e.g., Rawls v. Conde Nast Publ., Inc., 446 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1971), in which the
defendant's entry into plaintiff's house to take fashion photographs clearly constituted a trespass, but
one that the jury apparently thought had been waived by the plaintiff's failure to make sufficiently
strenuous and continuing objections to the intrusion.
1978]
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tion being served by assertion of the right of privacy is an expansion of
the measure of damages. Similarly, the invasion may result in the inten-
tional infliction of mental distress, a tort that substantially overlaps the
"intrusion" branch of the right of privacy.5 6
To constitute the tort, the intrusion must meet a two-pronged test: it
must be an activity that would be objectionable to a reasonable man, and
"the thing into which there is intrusion or prying must be, and be entitled
to be, private." 5" Since it is technique and not content that is in issue,
it is both plausible and reasonable for a court to impose liability on a
defendant who sought information about the quality or ownership of real
property by using a patently offensive method or device. Publication or
other use of the information would appear to be irrelevant to liability in
such a case, 58 although publication may add other grounds for liability.5 9
3. Public disclosure of private facts
The aspect of the right of privacy that sanctions public disclosure of
private facts is not likely to be applied to disclosures concerning owner-
ship of real property or its physical characteristics because such facts are
generally not "private" in the sense the term is used here. Public disclo-
sure cases, like those involving intrusion, are intended to protect the
plaintiff's dignity from embarrassment or affront.60 Information about
land is only rarely so personal that it would raise such issues. Conceiv-
ably, liability could result from a disclosure that the plaintiff owned land
on which some illegal, noxious, or socially disapproved activity was tak-
ing place. Information about land use alone would not be enough; to be
56. Most plaintiffs do, in fact, allege this element in their complaint for invasion of privacy. See,
e.g., Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1948); Pinkerton Nat'l
Detective Agency v. Stevens, 108 Ga. App. 159, 132 S.E.2d 119 (1963). Harassing activities of bill
collectors frequently satisfy the elements of both torts. See, e.g., Rugg v. McCarty, 173 Colo. 170.
476 P.2d 753 (1970).
57. W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 117, at 808.
58. See generally cases cited at note 54 supra.
59. For example, if defendant publicly disclosed that the results of geophysical testing revealed
the absence of mineral deposits on plaintiff-landowner's property, the potential marketability of the
real estate could be diminished. Although prospective buyers may have insisted on identical geophys-
ical tests prior to purchasing the property, the plaintiff's potential bargaining and contractual power
has been undercut, and he may therefore have a cause of action against the defendant. See generally
discussion of geophysical testing and business torts, notes 99-114 & accompanying text infra.
60. See W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 117, at 809-12. Typically, the facts in question must be
intimate or embarrassing in nature, such as those involving sexual behavior or prior criminal activity.
See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publ. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711
(1940) (information concerning former child prodigy is not so personal that its publication is contrary
to community notions of decency).
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actionable, the publication would have to link the plaintiff's name or
identity with the property.
4. Privilege to invade privacy of public figures or in the public interest
For many years state courts have held that one who places another
before the public in a false light or who makes a public disclosure of
private facts about that person is privileged to do so if the event or fact is
newsworthy or if the other person is a public figure. 61 This common
law privilege, which has not been applied to intrusion or appropriation
cases, 62 was generally thought to have a basis in the first amendment, 63
but the Supreme Court did not so hold until 1967 in Time, Inc. v.
Hill." In Hill, the plaintiffs had been held hostage in their own home
by three gunmen for nineteen hours. Fictionalized accounts of the episode
were published as a novel and a stage play, neither of which identified
the Hills. Life magazine, however, published an article that named them
and portrayed the play as founded on their experience. The Hills' suit,
based on the "false light" branch of the right of privacy,65 resulted in a
judgment against the publisher in the New York courts.6 6  The Supreme
Court reversed on the basis of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 67 which
had created a first amendment privilege for libel of a public official in the
absence of actual malice.
In several aspects, Hill was a rather startling extension of Sullivan,
which had involved an advertisement criticizing (partially by false allega-
tions) the handling of racial demonstrations by the Montgomery,
Alabama, police. The plaintiff in Sullivan was an elected official em-
broiled in a public controversy, while the Hills were private citizens
61. See W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 118, at 823-26. The two privileges mentioned are argu-
ably identical, with the activities of public figures being inherently newsworthy and of public in-
terest. See I F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 9.7, at 688 (1956).
62. W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 118, at 822.
63. See, e.g., Gill v. Hearst Publ. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 234, 253 P.2d 441 (1953) (couple photo-
graphed in affectionate embrace in public); Hull v. Curtis Publ. Co., 182 Pa. Super. 86, 125 A.2d
644 (1956) (photograph of police officers beating prisoner roughly); Silver, Privacy and the First
Amendment, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 553 (1966).
64. 385 U.S. 374 (1967); see Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and
Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?, 46 TEX. L. REV. 611 (1968).
65. The facts of Hill suggest that the public disclosure of private facts, rather than the false light,
was the real concern of the plaintiffs. It is likely that their complaint took the former form because of
the favorable New York statute and precedents and because they hoped that the state law privilege
for matters of public interest would carry less weight in a false light context.
66. Hill v. Hayes, 18 App. Div. 2d 485, 240 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1963), aft'd, 15 N.Y.2d 986, 207
N.E.2d 604, 260 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1965), amended, 16 N.Y.2d 658, 209 N.E.2d 282, 261 N.Y.S.2d
289 (1965).
67. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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whose only newsworthy activity had been involuntary and had occurred
three years prior to the publication. Thus the Court shifted its focus from
the public status of the plaintiff to the public interest in the occur-
rence. 68 In addition, the Court expanded the application of the first
amendment from a libel case (in which truth would normally be a de-
fense) to a privacy case (in at least some forms of which truth is nor-
mally irrelevant). 6" The actual malice exception, which excludes from
first amendment coverage statements that are knowingly false or made in
reckless disregard for truth, 70 makes sense in false light cases because
they are similar to libel in the sense of having falsity as an essential
element. Presumably Hill's malice exception is irrelevant to cases of pub-
lic disclosure of private facts because in those cases the state decisions
recognize that the plaintiff has been wronged irrespective of the truthful-
ness of the publication. 71
This is not to say that the first amendment has no application to other-
wise tortious public disclosures of private facts. Although the Court in
Hill expressly left this matter for further development, 72 the state law
background of this branch of the privacy tort is so laden with first
amendment references that it is unrealistic to suppose that the Supreme
Court will exempt it from constitutional coverage. On the other hand, the
application of an actual malice rule to public disclosure cases is nonsensi-
cal, and a holding that truth is an absolute constitutional defense would
destroy this branch of the tort entirely. Perhaps the most probable ap-
proach is for the Court simply to adopt the state holdings, rather than to
attempt to rewrite them as it did for libel and false light in Sullivan and
Hill. 73
68. See Lehmann, Triangulating the Limits on the Tort of Invasion of Privacy: The Development
of the Remedy in Light of the Expansion of Constitutional Privilege, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 543,
566-67 (1976).
69. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931) (publication of information contained
in records of a previous trial held not to violate privacy rights).
70. 385 U.S. at 387. The phrase "reckless disregard" was subsequently defined as a "high
degree of awareness of ... probable falsity," Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964), and
as "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investiga-
tion and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers," Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts. 388
U.S. 130, 158 (1967).
71. By its own terms, the decision in Hill appears limited to false light cases. 385 U.S. 374. 383
n.7; see Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
72. 385 U.S. at 383 n.7.
73. See Comment, An Accommodation of Privacy Interests and First Amendment Rights in Public
Disclosure Cases, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1385 (1976). A balancing approach was taken by the court in
Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), involving a Sports Illustrated story about a
California surfer that disclosed rather intimate personal details not directly pertinent to his concededly
newsworthy surfing activities. In a suit for public disclosure of private facts the court as a matter of
constitutional law adopted the state law privilege rules of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
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Whatever the status of the constitutional privilege publicly to disclose
private facts involving public figures or the public interest, it is clear that
the cases discussed above do not weaken the privilege as it has developed
in state law. 74  Both categories of privilege -public figures and public
interest-are relevant to the analysis of secrecy in land ownership. As
already suggested,75 it may be the very prominence of the plaintiff that
leads him to wish to conceal his ownership of particular land or build-
ings; yet the privilege doctrine suggests that celebrity status and secrecy
are incompatible and that his action for public disclosure of allegedly
private facts concerning land or ownership would be barred. One might
suppose that to earn the privilege, the disclosures ought to have some
652D (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975) and held the publication of the nonpublic matters tortious. See 29
VAND. L. REV. 870 (1976).
The impact of Hill has been severely restricted by the Court along another dimension by Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Gertz was an attorney hired to bring a civil action against
a Chicago policeman accused of unjustifiably killing a youth. The defendant's magazine published an
article about the case which falsely accused Gertz of various Communist associations and depicted
him as the architect of a "frame up" of the policeman. Gertz brought a libel action and won a jury
award of $50,000. On certiorari, the defendant argued that the article had been published without
actual malice and thus was privileged under Sullivan.
The Court conceded that there was no evidence of actual malice but nonetheless rejected Welch's
defense. In doing so, it apparently abandoned the distinction between matters of public and private
interest that had been adopted in Hill. Instead, it found the critical distinction to be the status of the
plaintiff as a public or a private figure-a reversion to the test articulated in Sullivan. If Gertz had
been deemed a public figure, the Court indicated that he would have had to show actual malice.
Since he was not, he would be permitted to recover upon whatever showing of evidence was required
by state law, but with the proviso that some degree of fault on the part of the defendant must be
shown. Since traditional libel law required no evidence of negligence or other fault, the Court has
apparently rewritten this entire body of law. Moreover, fault seems to be required whether or not the
subject matter is of public interest. See Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise
of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199 (1976).
Presumably the same approach would now be taken by the Court in a "false light" privacy case
like Hill. Rather clearly the Hills were "private persons" under the Court's definition in Gertz, and
on that basis might be able to recover from Time, Inc., merely by showing its negligence. The
opinion in Gertz, however, does not make this explicit. Moreover, Justice Powell's opinion in Gertz
cautions that "different considerations" might apply to a published statement the substance of which
did not "warn a reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster of its defamatory potential." 418 U.S. at
348. One might infer that in such a case (and Hill is of this type, since the statements in Hill were
laudatory, though false) the publisher, not having the benefit of a warning from the content of the
statements, would be protected by the full weight of the Sullivan doctrine notwithstanding the private
status of the plaintiffs.
The holding of Gertz seems confused, and its application to privacy cases uncertain. Nothing in
the opinion seems to contradict the conclusion reached in the text that Sullivan and Hill are inappli-
cable to the public disclosure of private facts.
74. It is apparent that there is no public figure/public interest privilege for violations of the right
of privacy which involve appropriation (since most of these cases involve overtly public persons) or
intrusion (which need not even result in publication to be tortious). The privilege is applicable only
in false light and public disclosure of private fact cases.
75. See text at note 3 supra.
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relevance to the public side of the plaintiff's life. Nonetheless, in cases
involving "voluntary" celebrities who have intentionally sought public-
ity, the rule seems to be that almost anything may be disclosed.76 The
plaintiff's status as a famous actor might well justify disclosures about
his ownership of an illegal gambling den or slum apartments. By con-
trast, persons who have not sought notoriety, but are involved in news-
worthy events, have lost their protection against public disclosures only
with respect to the events in question and presumably some reasonable
amount of background information."
In cases in which the plaintiff is not a public personality, then, the
question becomes one of defining "newsworthiness" or the "public in-
terest." Clearly these terms are not confined to reporting of current
events, but encompass the general process of informing and even enter-
taining the public. 78 In addition, they cannot realistically be regarded as
absolutes, such that the privilege would surely exist if a public interest
were present and not if it were absent. Rather, the courts are increasingly
employing a balancing approach to resolve the competing interests of the
publisher and public on the one hand and the noncelebrity plaintiff on the
other. A good illustration is Goldman v. Time, Inc., 79 in which Life
magazine published a story on young Americans travelling in Europe.
The plaintiffs were interviewed by a Life reporter in Crete and were fea-
tured in the story, which they alleged cast them in a false light. As one
ground for rejection of the plaintiffs' claim, the court, applying California
law, weighed the social value of the facts published plus the degree of
voluntariness of the plaintiffs' cooperation with the publisher, against the
depth of the article's intrusion into private affairs. This sort of judicial
technique may be criticized as lacking precision and predictability, but
76. Thus, detailed and unflattering biographies of such persons are held privileged. See, e.g.,
Sidis v. F-R Publ. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940) (biography of former child mathematical
prodigy); Koussevitsky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, Inc., 188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 272 App. Div. 759, 69 N.Y.S.2d 432, appeal denied, 272 App. Div. 794, 71 N.Y.S.2d 712
(1947) (biography of famous symphony conductor); Corabi v. Curtis Publ. Co., 441 Pa. 432, 273
A.2d 899 (1971) (biography of "Tiger Lil," a well-known entertainer and accused burglar); W.
PROSSER, supra note 16, § 118, at 829.
77. See, e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975); Stryker v. Republic Pictures
Corp., 108 Cal. App. 2d 191, 238 P.2d 670 (1951) (film portrayal of the military life of a soldier
who played a prominent part in the assault on Iwo Jima held to be privileged); Melvin v. Reid, 112
Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931). The passage of time since the newsworthy event may further
attenuate the privilege unless the event itself was unusually spectacular. See Briscoe v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 2d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971).
78. Carlisle v. Fawcett Publ., Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 732, 20 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1962); Paulsen v.
Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1968).
79. 336 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
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given the enormous range of facts that arise in privacy cases, it is doubt-
ful that any better rule can be formulated. Indeed, most privacy decisions
probably reflect a similar process, although often it is unarticulated.
How should the public interest privilege be applied to facts about land
or its ownership? If activities on the land are illegal or noxious to soci-
ety, the newsworthiness of a report about them would not be difficult to
establish."" Suppose, however, that the facts in issue are more mundane
and are interesting only to those who might consider purchasing or rent-
ing the land. Can there be a general public interest in the publication of
such market-related facts? In an economic system such as that of the
United States, based on free transactions in a competitive market, the
public interest in the availability of such information seems incontrovert-
ible. The specific interest thus served is that of optimal allocation of soci-
ety's resources. 81 To the extent that relevant information is withheld,
prices paid may not accurately reflect the value and potential productivity
of the land being transferred; some parties will suffer financial disaster
while others will enjoy windfalls, but the economy as a whole may be
the loser.82  The common law privilege for publication of matters of
public interest surely should be extended to cover such information even
when the plaintiff has not cooperated in the publication, except when
highly personal or intrusive material is included.
Moreover, there is strong authority that the first amendment directly
protects such market-related publications. In Virginia Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 8 3 the Supreme Court struck
80. See Bergman v. Stein, 404 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (published story on allegedly
unethical conduct of plaintiff's nursing home business held privileged).
81. See note 30 & accompanying text supra.
82. The classic model of the competitive market assumes that a single fungible product is traded,
so knowledge by the participants of its quality becomes irrelevant. WYSTRA, INTRODUCTORY
ECONOMIcs 358-60 (1971). In markets with differentiated products (and real estate is perhaps the
most varied product imaginable), an assumption of all knowledge of the product's quality by all
participants would appear to be a reasonable substitute. Whether or not market efficiency will be
maximized by provision of such widespread knowledge will depend on the cost of obtaining the
information. Most economic research on information costs and their impact on markets has been
focused on information concerning price rather than quality. See, e.g., Hirschleifer, Where Are We in
the Theory of Information?, 63 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 31 (1973); Rothschild, Models
of Market Organization with Imperfect Information: A Survey, 81 J. POL. ECON. 1283 (1973). But
irrespective of the impact on market efficiency of information-gathering, it appears indisputable that
the seller of land cannot reasonably object to potential buyers' efforts to become informed about its
quality. If they have concluded that the cost of the information is worth its benefits, and if that cost
is theirs and not the seller's, his only remaining ground for resistance can be his hope of pulling off
an essentially unfair transaction.
83. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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down state restrictions on price advertising of prescription drugs. Justice
Blackmun's opinion for the majority notes:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem,
is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and
selling what product, for what reason, and at what price. So long as
we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of
our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private
economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those deci-
sions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end,
the free flow of commercial information is indispensable .... And if
it is indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enter-
prise system, it is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent
opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered. There-
fore, even if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an
instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy, we
could not say that the free flow of information does not serve that
goal. 84
In 1977, the Court in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Wil-
lingboro 85 applied these same principles to information regarding real
property, striking down a town ordinance that prohibited the posting of
"for sale" signs. Justice Marshall's opinion for a unanimous Court relied
heavily on Virginia Board of Pharmacy. The Court held that the town's
ostensible interest in preventing rapid racial turnover was insufficient to
override the first amendment right of home buyers and sellers to convey
and receive the market information that "for sale" signs transmitted. 86
Other types of relevant information, such as that relating to price, qual-
ity, and title, should be equally entitled to constitutional protection. A
balancing of the interests is obviously necessary, but absent some highly
offensive, embarrassing, or misleading element, the assertion of first
amendment protection is entitled to great weight.
5. The public records privilege
Paralleling the public figure/public interest privilege, the privilege to
report and publish facts contained in official records and proceedings has
84. Id. at 765.
85. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
86. The Court noted that there was little evidence of "paAic selling" in the town and implied
that such evidence might have led to a different result. Id. at 95 n.9. Thus, the Court declined to
overrule Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974), in which "panic
selling" has been proved.
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been recognized by state courts for some years. 87  Several earlier deci-
sions of the Supreme Court had suggested a first amendment basis for the
privilege,88 but this was not confirmed by the Supreme Court until 1975
in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.8  The Cohn case grew out of an
attempt by the Georgia legislature to limit the public records privilege by
making it a misdemeanor to publish the identity of a rape victim. 90 The
defendant's reporter, who learned Miss Cohn's name from the indict-
ments of those charged with her rape and murder, identified her by name
in a television news report. Her father filed an invasion of privacy suit on
the basis of the statute. The Georgia Supreme Court held that in light of
the statute the defendant had no privilege to identify the victim. The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the first amendment
mandates a privilege to publish the contents of official public records and
documents.91
The case has striking implications for those who publish information
about land ownership and use, although there are no decisions applying
the holding in this context. 9 2 To the extent that ownership data is found
in public records, it appears to be constitutionally privileged. Similarly,
citations naming building owners for violations of housing and building
codes are ordinarily public records and presumably privileged. Of course,
the available records may not be as informative as the seeker might wish;
landowners still have various techniques available to disguise their own-
ership.9 3 It is conceivable, however, that Cohn could be extended to
cover all of the types of data normally contained in public records, even
though in a given case the owner had used a trust or nominee to conceal
his identity and the defendant had discovered his identity by other means.
This interpretation of Cohn would amount to a rule that disclosures con-
cerning landowners' identities and perhaps some basic data about land
use are inherently privileged, irrespective of the actual source of the in-
87. Firth v. Associated Press, 176 F. Supp. 871 (D.S.C. 1959); Berg v. Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1948); Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d
304, 95 P.2d 491 (1939). See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAPV. L. REV. 193,
216-17 (1890).
88. See, e.g., Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
89. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
90. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1977). A similar statute was upheld in State v. Evjue, 253
Wis. 146, 33 N.W.2d 305 (1948).
91. This holding is consistent with a prior state decision on similar facts. Hubbard v. Journal
Publ. Co., 69 N.M. 473, 363 P.2d 147 (1962).
92. One pre-Cohn case that applies the privilege to property-related records is Bell v. Courier-
Journal & Louisville Times Co., 402 S.W.2d 84 (Ky. 1966) (published statement that judge's prop-
erty taxes were delinquent).
93. See text accompanying notes 7-13 supra.
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formation. Although such a holding would clearly be an expansion of
Cohn, it would be a plausible one.
On the other hand, Cohn may be read restrictively in at least two
respects that are relevant to the present analysis. First, it may be argued
that the holding is applicable only when the public interest is related to
some currently newsworthy event. The broadcast involved in Cohn oc-
curred at the time of the judicial hearing, only eight months after the
crime was committed. Yet no such limitation inheres in the language of
Cohn. On the contrary, the Court seems to create a privilege for any and
all public records, since "[b]y placing the information in the public do-
main on official court records, the State must be presumed to have con-
cluded that the public interest was thereby being served." 94 The Kansas
Supreme Court concluded that currency of the event was not a require-
ment and applied the holding of Cohn to a newspaper story about the
alleged misfeasance in office of a policeman who had retired ten years
earlier. 5 Presumably land records, no matter how ancient, would be
eligible for the same treatment.
A second limitation that may be implicit in Cohn is the power of the
state to declare certain records to be nonpublic. The opinion in Cohn
expressly avoids comment on the validity of this technique.9 6  Sub-
sequent state cases have held, however, that there is such a power and
that no privilege exists to publish facts appearing in nonpublic gov-
ernmental documents if the publication is in other respects a violation of
the right of privacy. 97  This position is, of course, subject to the standard
enunciated in Time, Inc. v. Hill and to further comment by the Supreme
Court. Moreover, there seems to be no present trend among the states
toward making records of land use or ownership nonpublic. 98 Neverthe-
94. 420 U.S. at 495.
95. Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publ. Co., 218 Kan. 295, 543 P.2d 988 (1975). If this holding is
correct, such cases as Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 2d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr.
866 (1971), which allowed the plaintiff to recover because the privilege was lost due to the lapse of
time, would be overruled to the extent that the information published was contained in public rec-
ords.
96. 420 U.S. at 496 n.26.
97. Deaton v. Delta Democrat PubI. Co., 236 So. 2d 471 (1976) (identifying children as re-
tarded); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Disciplinary Bd., 468 Pa. 382, 363 A.2d 779 (1976)
(hearing on reinstatement of attorney to the bar); McLaughlin v. Philadelphia Newspapers. Inc.. 465
Pa. 104, 348 A.2d 376 (1975) (disbarment proceedings); Houston Chronicle Publ. Co. v. City of
Houston, 531 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. 1975) (police "rap sheet"). See also Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S.
306, 328 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (parents have constitutional right to enjoin publication of a
report on school discipline problems that names their children).
98. Indeed, a contrary trend may be developing. See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of
1974 § 13, 12 U.S.C.A. § 2611 (1976) (provided for establishment of a land parcel recordation
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less, the possibility exists that states could place some land records that
are now public beyond the reach of Cohn.
B. The Geophysical Exploration Cases
Suppose A owns land that is located in an oil-producing area. A's land
is yet unexplored for petroleum potential. B, who may be an oil company
employee, a newspaperman, a government agent, or merely a busybody,
conducts surveys or tests that indicate an absence of oil on A's property.
The tests are carried out by "shooting" explosive charges and measuring
the sonic echoes, by magnetic measurements, or by whatever other
technological means will produce the desired information. They involve
no entry on A's land; B works from test sites on adjacent public roads or
neighboring property. Upon completion of his tests, B publishes to the
world the fact that A's land is barren of oil. As a result, the market value
of the land is drastically reduced. May A recover damages from B, and if
so, by what measure?
Some obvious variants of this fact situation must first be eliminated. If
the seismic tests have produced physical damage to A's land or im-
provements, recovery for the harm is certainly proper. 99 If B has A's
permission to make the tests, A can hardly complain. 100 If B is A's
present or former employee or has a fiduciary relationship with him that
implies a duty of confidentiality, B's breach of that duty by disclosure of
the facts to others is wrongful and actionable. 10 1 If B's statements to the
world are false, A may be able to develop a case based on commercial
disparagement or the like.'
Consider, however, the unadorned case in which none of these variants
appears. The problem is purely one of information and the defendant's
means of obtaining it. Rather surprisingly, virtually every case consider-
ing the matter has concluded that the landowner has in principle some
right of action,10 3 although in numerous instances he has failed to recover
system, on demonstration basis, in various areas of United States); D. MOYER & K. FISHER, LAND
PARCEL IDENTIFIERS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS (1973); Cook, Land Law Reform: A Modern
Computerized System of Land Records, 36 U. CIN. L. REV. 385 (1969).
99. Leonard v. Texaco, Inc., 422 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1967). See generally, Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d
1372 (1951).
100. Common law trespass, for example, is defined as an unauthorized entry on another's land.
W. PROSSER, supra note 16, at 63.
101. Tlapek v. Chevron Oil Co., 407 F.2d 1129 (8th Cir. 1969); Ohio Oil Co. v. Sharp, 135 F.2d
303 (10th Cir. 1943).
102. See text accompanying notes 115-21 infra.
103. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §10.9, at 534-36 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); Annot., 67
A.L.R.2d 444 (1959). See generally Hawkins, The Geophysical Trespasser and Negligent Geophysi-
cal Explorer, 29 TEX. L. REV. 310 (1951).
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because of some defect in proof. 104 The decisions frequently rest on the
assertion that the exclusive right to explore one's own land is a property
right, and therefore, the unauthorized exploration by another is a tres-
pass. 10 5  This sort of reasoning is, of course, circular; the right to
explore is a property right only if it is an interest the courts will protect
by sanctioning those who invade it. Rather obviously, some better expla-
nation of the result the courts reach is needed.
The measures of damages typically employed in these cases strongly
suggest that the interest being protected is not in land, but in information.
Most commonly, the courts have measured damages by taking testimony
as to the normal fee in the vicinity for a "shooting permit" (the right to
make geologic tests, but no more) or a "selection lease" (the right to
make tests, coupled with an option for the explorer to lease such portions
of the land as he then desires on previously agreed terms). 10 6 Plainly,
one who purchases a shooting permit is buying the right to information
and nothing more. A few courts have suggested that the landowner is
entitled to further damages, measured by the diminution of market value
of the land resulting from the disclosure of the explorer's findings. 10 7
This measure may be viewed as a sort of consequential damage flowing
from the misappropriation of the information. Whichever measure is
used, it is clearly the right to information that is at issue; to cast the
problem in real property terms is not helpful.
At first blush, it seems attractive to apply the right of privacy concept
to the geological exploration cases, for they bear similarities to three of
the types of privacy cases discussed above: appropriation, intrusion, and
public disclosure of private facts. They are like appropriation cases in the
sense that the explorer is usually carrying on his activities for a commer-
cial purpose; he expects to sell the information he gleans or to use it
himself in arriving at a sound bid or offer for the mineral rights in the
plaintiff's land. Yet these cases do not fit the appropriation category per-
fectly since appropriation involves the plaintiff's name or likeness, 10
104. See, e.g., Kennedy v. General Geophysical Co., 213 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Ct. App. 1948). In
cases in which the oil or mineral interest has been severed from the surface estate, it is usually held
that the subsurface rather than the surface owner is the proper plaintiff. Tinsley v. Seismic Explora-
tions, Inc., IlI So. 2d 834 (La. Ct. of App. 1959); Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Puckett, 29 S.W.2d
809 (Tex. Ct. App. 1930).
105. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957).
106. Shell Petroleum Co. v. Scully, 71 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1934); Layne La. Co. v. Superior Oil
Co., 209 La. 1014, 26 So. 2d 20 (1946); Harrell v. F. H. Vahsling, Inc., 248 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1952).
107. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957); Angelloz v. Humble Oil &
Ref. Co., 196 La. 604, 199 So. 656 (1940).
108. See notes 45-52 & accompanying text supra.
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while the exploration of land involves only its physical characteristics.
The owner's name is usually well known or is a matter of public record,
but it is not being exploited by the defendant.
Unauthorized exploration is also similar to the intrusion cases in the
sense that electronic or other scientific means are used to investigate and
acquire information. In the typical exploration case, however, nothing
occurs that would offend the personal sensibilities of the plaintiff. If
shock or sound waves are employed, they may well be so weak as to be
unnoticed even by persons on the land. Indeed, the land is frequently
unoccupied and the owner does not learn of the intrusion until later. A
few cases have extended the privacy-intrusion concept to information
about the plaintiff's bank accounts, 10 9 but in these cases the facts seem
to raise a considerably stronger expectation of confidentiality than is the
case with the physical characteristics of land. It is similarly difficult to fit
the exploration cases into the category of public disclosure of private
facts. The problem is that the facts in question are really not very private.
There is nothing intimate or embarrassing about having the world know
that there is (or is not) oil under one's land. 110
Thus, although the tort law of privacy provides a more useful mode of
analysis for "geophysical trespass" cases than does the law of trespass, it
is clear that in the usual case there is no breach of the right of privacy.
For the reasons of equity and economic efficiency already discussed, 11'
the privacy concept should not be extended to cover these cases, and the
trespass holdings should be overruled. The preferable rule would allow
exploration and publication of results by anyone willing to invest his
energies in doing so, with no ensuing liability on any theory. Some cau-
tion, however, seems necessary here. Obviously, physical damage by the
explorer should give rise to a money judgment for the plaintiff.
Moreover, our common law conception of the exclusive right to posses-
sion associated with ownership of land is so powerful that a court should
hold the explorer liable, at least for nominal damages (and perhaps for
109. Prosser cites Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936) and Brex v. Smith, 104
N,J. Eq. 481, 146 A. 34 (1929). for this proposition. W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 117, at 808
n.60. Both cases involve injunctions against governmental intrusions, and it is not certain that similar
results would follow if the defendants were private parties to whom no fourth amendment liability
attached. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), which upholds legislation that
would permit governmental scrutiny of private bank accounts but recognizes potential constitutional
limits on such activity; see also notes 147-53 & accompanying text infra.
110. See Bergman v. Stein, 404 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (details of plaintiff's business not
sufficiently private); Hamilton v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 246 Or. 1, 423 P.2d 771 (1967) (fact and
amount of widow's life insurance benefits check not sufficiently private).
I 11. See notes 81-84 & accompanying text supra.
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punitive damages as well, when motivated by bad faith) 112 if he intrudes
physically on the plaintiff's land. Finally, it seems equitable to give the
landowner a right (albeit nonexclusive) to information about his own
land. One who explores it by remote devices should be obligated to share
his results with the owner. 113 Otherwise, a misallocation of resources
might well occur, but with reversed roles; the owner would be ignorant
and the purchaser might successfully underbid the real value substan-
tially. The owner ought to be permitted to demand the purchaser's infor-
mation and to get a court order compelling its delivery if it is not pro-
vided voluntarily. Enforcement of this rule may not be simple, since in
the case of oil and mineral deposits, soundings taken with respect to one
parcel of land may be almost meaningless unless fitted into a broader
pattern of data taken from other parcels in the vicinity.' 14 It seems ap-
propriate to give the landowner-plaintiff the information about his own
land without charge, but to compel him to pay a reasonable contribution
toward the defendant's expenses as to other relevant information needed
to provide a comprehensive picture of the value of the plaintiff's land.
Although this discussion has centered on mineral deposits, prospective
buyers sometimes wish to obtain other types of information about land by
means of appraisals, expert inspections, or the like. Generally, such in-
formation cannot be collected without the current owner's permission or
an overt and direct trespass. It would be a great departure from our cus-
tomary view of exclusivity in ownership to hold that the owner has a
duty to grant such permission, or to deny recovery if a trespass is com-
mitted by the buyer or his agents. In the great bulk of cases such ques-
tions will be settled amicably by contract or informal agreement between
the parties. Once the information has been obtained, however, the forego-
ing analysis suggests that the prospective buyer of the land may pass it
on to others with impunity unless he has contracted not to do so. It is
socially desirable to encourage dissemination of such information, since
otherwise future prospective purchasers will either have to duplicate the
expense of the inspections or take the risk of paying an unreasonably
high price for defective property. That the owner should also have a right
to obtain copies of the relevant reports and data without cost also seems
entirely justified by public policy. Unfortunately, there are no cases deal-
ing with these problems.
112. Geophysical Serv., Inc. v. Thigpen, 233 Miss. 454, 102 So. 2d 423 (1958); Oden v. Rus-
sell, 207 Okla. 570, 251 P.2d 184 (1952); Annot., Ill A.L.R. 91 (1937).
113. The defendant's offer to share the information with the plaintiff was held to be a factor
mitigating damages in Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Scully, 71 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1934).
114. See Hawkins, supra note 103, at 315.
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C. Business Torts
Conceivably, one who reveals information about another's land may
become liable to the owner under one of the so-called business torts:
injurious falsehood and interference with contract or economic advantage.
The term injurious falsehood, as used in current drafts of the Restatement
of Torts, '15 includes two types of actions that were previously considered
to be separate, though related. These are slander of title and commercial
disparagement. The former obviously refers to false and derogatory
statements about the plaintiff's title to property, and the latter to such
statements about the property's quality." 6  Injurious falsehood com-
prehends these and a few other, less common, fact situations.' 17 The
matter need not detain us, however, since it is clear that one element of
the tort is falsehood; a truthful statement cannot result in liability. 11 8
Hence, if the defendant's only behavior is to acquire and publish or re-
port information, this tort need not concern him.
The matter is not so simple with regard to interference with contract or
economic advantage, 119 however. Suppose an owner has entered into a
contract to sell his land or has placed it on the market in the hope of
sale. Before a transaction is consummated, however, some third party
learns of derogatory information about the quality or title of the property
and transmits this knowledge to the prospective buyer or the market at
large. As a result, the owner is obliged to forego sale or accept a reduced
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A (Tent. Draft No. 22, 1976); see also Prosser,
Injurious Falsehood: The Basis of Liability, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 425 (1959).
116. Wright v. Rogers, 172 Cal. App. 2d 349, 342 P.2d 447 (1959) (filed unfounded claim for
property); Lehman v. Goldin, 160 Fla. 710, 36 So. 2d 259 (1948) (offered another's land for sale in
a contract); Frega v. Northern N.J. Mortgage Ass'n, 51 N.J. Super. 531, 143 A.2d 885 (1958) (filed
false lien); Mink Hollow Development Corp. v. New York, 87 Misc. 2d 61, 384 N.Y.S.2d 373
(1976) (land erroneously described as situated in unapproved subdivision).
117. These residual situations involve false statements, not concerning the quality or title of prop-
erty and not defamatory, that nonetheless cause harm. Examples are statements about the plaintiff's
business or commercial activities or even personal affairs that discourage others from dealing with
him or otherwise interfere with his relationships. See W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 128, at 919-20.
118. Id. at 920; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A (Tent. Draft No. 22, 1976). A
variety of other privileges also exist, including a possible constitutional privilege under Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The other privileges will not be discussed since the
privilege of truth is sufficient for present purposes. See generally Note, Corporate Defamation and
Product Disparagement: Narrowing the Analogy to Personal Defamation, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 963
(1975).
119. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 6.5-6.12 (1956); W. PROSSER, supra
note 16, §§ 129-30; Harper, Interference with Contractual Relations, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 873
(1953). Interference with contractual relations can occur only when the plaintiff and another have
already entered into a contract; interference with prospective economic advantage is applicable when
no contract has yet been formed.
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price. Clearly such verbal persuasion, if it is successful in discouraging
the sale, can constitute the tort of interference. 120 In interference cases,
unlike those of injurious falsehood, falsity of the information imparted is
not an essential ingredient of the plaintiff's prima facie case. Instead, the
key element is the revelation of disparaging information with the inten-
tion of injuring the plaintiff. 121
Once such a revelation is proven, the defendant may be able to justify
his conduct on any of several grounds. One such justification is "an
impersonal or disinterested motive of a laudable character." 122 This de-
fense is built primarily on public policy; it allows interference for the
public good. 122  A more common defense is the privilege to give honest
advice. The advice need not even be accurate; the sole requirement is that
it be given in good faith upon a party's request. 124  Finally, among the
common justifications, a person may relay information that may induce a
party to breach a contract, if doing so will protect the actor's pre-existing
economic interest. '
25
Whether truth can be asserted as a defense to a suit for interference is
an issue on which authority is surprisingly meager. Dean Prosser suggests
that
the mere statement of existing facts, or assembling of information in
such a way that the party persuaded recognizes it as a reason for
120. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766, Comment f (1939). Virtually identical principles apply to
both interference with economic advantages and interference with contract. Id. Comment b.
121. Originally courts held that the intention to interfere had to be malicious in order to constitute
the tort, see, e.g., Tunley v. Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853), and early cases sought to find actual
ill will. See, e.g., Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904). As business transactions became more
complex, however, the malice concept evolved into an intent to profit at the plaintiff's expense. see.
e.g., Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 243 Ala. 622, 11 So. 2d 383 (1943); Schechter v. Friedman. 141
N.J. Eq. 318, 57 A.2d 251 (1948), and later into merely the intent to interfere with the plaintiff's
commercial dealing. Meyer v. Washington Times Co., 76 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Reichman v.
Drake, 89 Ohio App. 222, 100 N.E.2d 533 (1951). The tort presently remains in this last form,
which interprets malice as merely demanding that the act be intentional. Thus, a negligent interfer-
ence would not be a sufficient basis for liability. This limitation appears to be due to the realization
that in a society in which so many transactions are closely interlocked, unintentional interferences are
practically inevitable and often unavoidable. See Carpenter, Interference with Contractual Relations,
41 HARV. L. REV. 728 (1928).
122. W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 129, at 943.
123. Examples of interference for the public good are rare. One of the few is found in Kuryen
Publ. Co. v. Messmer, 162 Wis. 565, 156 N.W. 948 (1916), in which a court held that a church,
which had forbade its members from purchasing or reading the plaintiff's newspaper because it was
"sinful," was not liable to the newspaper.
124. Delaware, L. & W.R.R. v. Switchmen's Union, 158 F. 541 (1907) (union advised employees
to go on strike, in violation of employment contract); Coakley v. Degner, 191 Wis. 170, 210 N.W.
359 (1926).
125. Meason v. Ralston Purina Co., 56 Ariz. 291, 107 P.2d 224 (1940); O'Brien v. Westem
Union Tel. Co., 62 Wash. 598, 114 P. 441 (1911).
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breaking the contract is not enough [to impose liability for inter-
ference], so long as the defendant creates no added reason and exerts
no other influence or pressure by his conduct.'
-2 6
This view is sound and should be followed simply out of deference to a
policy encouraging the free flow of information, but it is difficult to find
either support or contradiction for it in the cases.1 27
Additionally, there is the real possibility of a first amendment privilege
along the lines of Sullivan 128 and GertZ. 129 Several conceptual problems
arise, however, in transferring the reasoning of these libel and false light
cases into the arena of interference with contract or prospective advan-
tage. One difficulty is the sporadic tendency of the Court to grant less
than full weight to the first amendment in protecting commercial or busi-
ness speech. 130  The defendant in an interference case may well have
communicated the bad news about the plaintiff's property out of purely
commercial motives, yet it is clear that such news may well be of crucial
importance to prospective buyers of the property and have critical
economic and even social consequences for them. 13 1  Although the sig-
nificance of the defendant's speech will vary with the specific facts, it
would be unwise and unreasonable to assume a priori that such com-
munication is entitled only to second-class first amendment protection.
126. W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 129, at 934-35.
127. See Martin v. Texaco, Inc.,304 F. Supp. 498 (S.D. Miss. 1969); Jensen v. Lundorff, 258
Minn. 275, 103 N.W.2d 887 (1960); Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 171 Minn. 260, 214 N.W.
754 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting).
128. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See notes 67 & accompanying text
supra.
129. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), discussed at note 73 supra.
130. The view that commercial speech is entitled to little or no first amendment protection origi-
nated in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (upholding police restraint of distributor of
commercial handbills on public street). See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (upholding ordinance that prohibited sex-designated help-wanted
newspaper advertisements). In Pebble Brook, Inc. v. Smith, 140 N.J. Super. 273, 356 A.2d 48
(1976), the court held that the defendants' picketing of the plaintiff developer's project was protected
by the first amendment and refused to enjoin it; yet it implied that the defendants might still be liable
for interference with contractual advantage. This implication seems both gratuitous and erroneous.
131.
As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information,
that interest may be as keen if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most
urgent political debate. . . . When drug prices vary as strikingly as they do, information
as to who is charging what becomes more than a convenience. It could mean the allevia-
tion of physical pain or the enjoyment of basic necessities.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763-64
(1976) (state prohibition on advertising of prescription drugs held invalid).
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The Court's recent decisions regarding advertising seem to recognize
generous constitutional protection for truthful commercial speech.' 32
A second problem is that, if truth is not a state law defense to the tort
of interference, the "actual malice" standard the Court has employed in
false light and defamation cases cannot readily be applied. In this respect
the tort of interference is like the public disclosure branch of the law of
privacy; 133 the gravamen is not the promulgation of error, but the prom-
ulgation of information itself. Two approaches to this situation seem open
to the Court. One is to follow the tack predicted above for the public
disclosure privacy cases-to balance case by case the harm to the plain-
tiff against the benefit to society flowing from the publication. 134  But
balancing may be unnecessary when the interference merely consists of
truthful statements. The tort of interference is not designed to protect
against statements of a highly intrusive personal nature the publication of
which would denigrate "our basic concept of the essential dignity and
worth of every human being." 133 In other words, it is not the privacy
interests of the plaintiff that are being protected in interference cases, but
only his economic interests, which would be entitled to considerably less
weight as against the free speech clause of the first amendment. Thus the
preferable approach would be for the Court to declare that as a matter of
first amendment right, truth is a defense to an interference complaint.1 36
In a sense, such a holding would be a rather mild assertion of the first
amendment by comparison with Gertz, which itself represents a re-
trenchment from earlier, more vigorous decisions. 137  In Gertz the Court
imposed the negligence of the defendant as a minimum element that all
states must recognize in false light cases involving nonpublic plaintiffs. A
fortiori, this holding also makes falsity an element in such cases, for it is
impossible to tell the truth negligently. The Court omitted any discussion
of truth as a constitutionally required defense simply because it was al-
ready required under state law. In the context of the tort of interference,
it is not so clear that state law requires falsity, but in view of the non-
intimate nature of the interest that the tort is designed to protect, it would
132. Id.; Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (state statute prohibiting the advertisement of
abortions held invalid).
133. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
134. Id.
135. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974), quoting Justice Stewart in
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966).
136. Cf. Note, Corporate Defamation and Product Disparagement: Narrowing the Analogy to
Personal Defamation, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 963, 983 (1975) (recovery of corporation in defamation
action should be limited to provable pecuniary loss).
137. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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be eminently reasonable for the Court to declare truth to be a constitu-
tionally mandatory defense. 138
D. Constitutional Limitations on Governmental Invasions of Privacy
If a state or the federal government collects, assembles, and dissemi-
nates to the public information about land ownership or use, does that
activity violate some concept of privacy embodied in the United States
Constitution? This issue will be analyzed here, but it substantially over-
laps the problems discussed in Part III of this article dealing with gov-
ernmentally required disclosure by landowners themselves. 139  Presum-
ably the constitutional limitations are similar whether the government acts
directly or compels the private owner to act to achieve the same result.
The present focus, however, is on direct federal or state action.
Although the term "privacy" is not mentioned in the Constitution, the
case law has developed at least three privacy-related constitutional
rights: 140 the right to be free from governmental interference and regula-
tion in "matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationship, and child rearing and education;" 141 the protection of indi-
viduals against unreasonable searches; 142 and the right to prevent the
government from publishing personal data it has collected from a citi-
zen. 143  For the purposes of this article, the third group of constitutional
138. The distinction between true and false statements for purposes of first amendment protection
was recognized by the Supreme Court in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), in which the Court stated, "Untruthful speech, commer-
cial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake." Id. at 771.
139. See notes 212-67 & accompanying text infra.
140. The three categories discussed in the text are not exhaustive of the various ways in which the
Supreme Court has used the term "privacy." For example, in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971), the Court referred to one's interest in avoiding undesired and unwarranted exposure to the
speech of others as a "privacy interest."
141. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 n.26 (1977), quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713
(1976).
142. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONST., amend. IV. See,
e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (warrantless wiretaps
for domestic security purposes violate fourth amendment); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) (warrantless attachment of listening device to telephone booth violated fourth amendment);
York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964) (nude photograph
taken by police of sexual assault victim violated fourth amendment). Cf. United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745 (1971) (transmitting device concealed on person of an informer not violative of fourth
amendment). See generally Stone, The Scope of the Fourth Amendment: Privacy and the Police Use
of Spies, Secret Agents, and Informers, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 1193.
143. Stone, supra note 142, at 1207. See also Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Parker,
A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275 (1974).
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privacy cases is of greatest interest. It is comprised of situations in which
the government's interest is clearly informational in nature and in which
the method of data collection is open, straightforward, and often defined
by a statute, regulation, or specific program. Those attacking such gov-
ernmental data systems seek judicial support for "the individual's interest
in determining for himself when, how, and to what extent information
about him is revealed to others." 144 Geoffrey Stone 145 has identified
several "sub-interests" that may be served by the individual's control of
such information: his sense of individuality and self-dignity, his avoid-
ance of embarrassment, his ability to maintain intimate personal associa-
tions with others, 146 and his freedom of thought and expression. To some
degree, each of these might be inhibited by untrammeled collection or
publication of personal information by the government. Although the
fourth amendment may be one source of limitation upon government in
this respect, the first, fifth, and ninth amendments are often asserted as
well.
In the last three years, a number of Supreme Court decisions have cast
light on the dimensions of the constitutional right to informational pri-
vacy, although none has struck down a governmental information sys-
tem. The first case germane to our inquiry is California Bankers Ass'n v.
Shultz, 117 in which bankers and depositors sought a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970.148 The Act re-
quired banks to maintain certain records and to report to the Secretary of
the Treasury all instruments transmitting funds exceeding $5,000 into or
out of the United States. Additionally, under broad statutory language,
the Secretary promulgated regulations that required the reporting of all
domestic bank transactions involving more than $10,000 in currency.1 49
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, held that the reporting
requirements did not violate the fourth amendment rights of the banks
144. Stone, supra note 142, at 1207-08.
145. Id.
146. In Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) and NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958), the Court disapproved data collection systems that attempted to elicit NAACP member-
ship lists on the ground that they inhibited freedom of association.
147. 416 U.S. 20 (1974). See also Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), in which parents of
public school children sued to compel deletion of their children's names from a congressional report
on school discipline problems. The Court held the publication was not privileged under the speech or
debate clause or the official immunity doctrine and remanded for a determination of the merits of the
parents' claims of invasion of privacy. The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REv. 221
(1973).
148. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-1959 (1970); 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1062, 1081-1083,
1101-1105, 1121-1122 (1970).
149, 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1977).
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and that the issue was not ripe as to the depositors since they had not
alleged that they had engaged in any transaction that would trigger the
reporting process. 15o
Justice Powell's concurrence indicated his discomfort with the major-
ity's holding. He noted that if the Treasury were to expand its regulations
to the full extent of reporting permitted by the Act, substantial constitu-
tional questions would be raised. As Justice Powell wrote:
Financial transactions can reveal much about a person's activities, as-
sociations and beliefs. At some point, governmental intrusion upon
these areas would implicate legitimate expectations of privacy.
Moreover, the potential for abuse is particularly acute where, as here,
the legislative scheme permits access to the information without invo-
cation of the judicial process. 1 5 1
In separate dissents, both Justices Douglas and Marshall went further,
concluding that the instant reporting procedures violated the fourth
amendment. For Douglas, "[o]ne's bank accounts are within the 'expec-
tations of privacy' category. For they mirror not only one's finances but
his interests, his debts, his way of life, his family, and his civic com-
mitments." 152
Although the majority did not purport to determine the depositors'
rights on the merits, it may have been influenced in favor of the govern-
ment by the fact that the reports to the Treasury were required to be kept
confidential and could be shared only with other federal agencies having
a legitimate interest in their contents.1 53  Neither Powell nor the dissent-
ers, however, appeared to consider the feature of confidentiality of much
importance, a rather surprising fact in light of the later developments
discussed below.
In a series of more recent cases the Court has dealt with governmental
information systems on the merits and has consistently upheld them. In
the first of these cases, Buckle)' v. Valeo, 154 Senator James Buckley and
a variety of other plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 as amended in 1974.155 Of present
150. 416 U.S. at 66-69. 72-75.
151. Id. at 78-79.
152. Id. at 89.
153. Id. at 40 n.17.
154. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
155. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 47 U.S.C.),
as amended by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, 47 U.S.C.).
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interest is the plaintiffs' attack on the Act's reporting and disclosure provi-
sions, which required each candidate and political committee in a presi-
dential or congressional election to report to the Federal Elections Com-
mission the names and addresses of all persons contributing more than
ten dollars. Persons contributing $100 or more, other than to candidates
or political committees, were required to file direct statements with the
Commission, which was authorized by the Act to publish the names of
those contributing more than $100, whether to candidates, committees, or
otherwise. The Court rejected the plaintiffs' attacks, which were based on
the first, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. It seemed most troubled by
the first amendment argument and conceded that the reporting and publi-
cation of campaign contributions were likely to have some inhibiting ef-
fect on freedom of association by deterring prospective contributors, par-
ticularly those solicited by minor or unpopular parties.t 56 In view of this
potential first amendment infringement, the competing governmental in-
terest in disclosure was required, at least ostensibly, to "survive exacting
scrutiny." 157 The Court identified two such interests: informing the
electorate of the sources of each candidate's financing and thus of his
probable loyalties and views; and minimizing violations of campaign
financing laws, both by deterring potential corruption and by exposing
that which actually occurred. 15 8  In what seems to have been simply a
"weighing" operation, the Court concluded that the governmental in-
terests were sufficiently substantial and upheld the Act.159
The fact that major contributors' names would be publicized by the
Commission is highly significant to the decision in Buckley, but it cuts
both ways. Although publicity tends to deter free association, it also
serves to inform the public of a politically relevant matter-the candi-
date's source of funds-and in that sense advances first amendment in-
terests. The opinion implies that the Court would have had even less
trouble upholding the Act if the reports had been made confidential, as
was the case for contributions between $10 and $100.160 In this range,
the governmental interest in exposing corruption would presumably re-
main, while the inhibitory effect of publicity would vanish; the Act
would be valid a fortiori.
156. 424 U.S. at 71.
157. Id. at 64.
158. Id. at 66-68.
159. Id. at 72. The Court left open the possibility that a minor party could qualify for exemption
from the Act by making a factual showing of "a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure
of a party's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either
Government officials or private parties" but saw no such evidence in the present case. Id. at 74.
160. The Act was silent with respect to publication of contributions between $10 and $100 and
was construed by the Court as authorizing public disclosure only about the $100 level. Id. at 83-84.
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It is unfortunate that the Court's analysis of the interests of the political
contributors was so narrow. It concentrated on the first amendment as-
sociational right and ignored the other aspects of the contributor's interest
in controlling access to information about himself: individuality, avoidance
of embarrassment, and freedom of expression.161 Arguably, even if the
interest in free association is fully protected by the assurance that the
government will hold confidential the information it collects, these other
interests are not protected. 6 ' Nonetheless, the case seems to provide a
rather clear answer on the merits to the generic question raised in
California Bankers. That answer favors governmental data collection, as
well as publication, although the political campaign context of the case
cautions against too broad a reading on the latter point.
Two more recent cases seem to solidify this expansive view of the
validity of governmental information systems, although both involve sys-
tems to which public access was prohibited. In Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 6I the Court upheld a state statute requiring physicians and
health facilities that perform abortions to maintain certain records of the
procedures for seven years and to make them available to local, state, or
national public health officers. The records were otherwise confidential.
The Court seemed to concede that the recordkeeping might act as a slight
inhibition on some women who wished to exercise their constitutional
right to obtain abortions, but concluded that the state's interest in protect-
ing public health and in accruing information regarding trends in medical
procedures and the like was sufficiently strong to be sustained. 164 As in
Buckley, the judicial process apparently involved weighing the competing
interests. No "compelling interest" or "strict scrutiny" test was men-
tioned, and the Court's analysis of the statute's intrusion on the patient's
"control of personal information" was even weaker than in Buckley. 165
Finally, in Whalen v. Roe, 166 the Court dealt with a New York statute
requiring physicians to submit reports to a state computer bank on pre-
scriptions they wrote for certain types of drugs. The program's purpose
was to identify illegal drug acquisitions by addicts and illegal behavior by
physicians and pharmacists as suppliers of drugs. The principal counter-
vailing concern noted by the Court was that the reporting procedure
161. See text accompanying notes 122-24 supra.
162. One may feel less embarrassed, indignant, or intruded upon if only the Commission knows
of his contributions than if the whole world knows. But even the Commission's fact-gathering may
evoke these emotions to some degree.
163. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
164. Id. at 80-81.
165. Id.
166. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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might deter some patients from seeking needed medication, an eventuality
the Court thought improbable. Emphasizing the extensive security precau-
tions taken to preclude public access to the data base in the state's com-
puter, the Court held the system valid. Still, the Court seemed less than
fully sanguine about its conclusion, and its final paragraph may be read
as a warning that some state-sponsored information systems may yet be
found not to pass constitutional muster:
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumu-
lation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data
banks or other massive government files. The collection of taxes, the
distribution of welfare and social security benefits, the supervision of
public health, the direction of our Armed Forces and the enforcement
of the criminal laws, all require the orderly preservation of great quan-
tities of information, much of which is personal in character and poten-
tially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed. The right to collect and use
such data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomi-
tant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures. Rec-
ognizing that in some circumstances that duty arguably has its roots in
the Constitution, nevertheless New York's statutory scheme, and its
implementing administrative procedures, evidence a proper concern
with, and protection of, the individual's interest in privacy. We there-
fore need not, and do not, decide any question which might be pre-
sented by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private data-
whether intentional or unintentional-or by a system that did not con-
tain comparable security provisions. We simply hold that this record
does not establish an invasion of any right or liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 167
All members of the Court joined in the opinion, which was written by
Justice Stevens. Justice Brennan concurred to express his view that, ab-
sent the existing safeguards against public access, the New York scheme
"would clearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy rights, and
would presumably be justified only by compelling state interests." 168
Neither Justices Powell nor Marshall re-expressed the concerns they had
articulated separately three years earlier in California Bankers. Quite
possibly they regarded information with respect to an individual's medi-
cations as more innocuous and hence less intrusive than his bank transac-
tions. Thus the Court seems to have set the stage for a continuing balanc-
ing process, in which the government's need for information and the
167. Id. at 605-06.
168. Id. at 606.
[Vol. 27:251
HeinOnline  -- 27 Am. U. L. Rev. 286 1977-1978
SECRECY & REAL PROPERTY
individual's desire to control personal information are both seen as
legitimate, though conflicting. 16 9
The analytic framework for future constitutional decisions involving
governmental data systems is likely to be quite similar to that that the
courts are developing in tort cases of public disclosure of private
facts.1 7t1  Some differences, however, are apparent. If an information
system incorporates adequate provisions for confidentiality, it thereby
eliminates both the free press first amendment argument (which would
tend to support the validity of the system) and much of the intrusiveness
(which would tend to negate its validity). Obviously the weight to be
attached to both the free press and control-of-personal-information argu-
ments will vary with the specific type of information involved. For
example, neither California Bankers, Planned Parenthood, nor Whalen
make any reference to the free press argument, presumably because the
statutes in question prohibited press access and because information about
a private person's bank transactions, abortion, or medication are not nor-
mally newsworthy or of public interest. But even if public disclosure is
forbidden, the intrusive quality of the process of information collection
and maintenance must still be weighed against the government's need for
the information. In addition, more limiting state constitutional decisions
are possible, although they have not yet been forthcoming. 171
169. One recent case that seems irreconcilable with Whalen and its predecessors is Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S, 693 (1976), noted in 90 HARV. L. REV. 86 (1976). in which five members of the Court
upheld the Louisville, Kentucky police department's action in circulating a flyer identifying the plain-
tiff as an active shoplifter despite the fact that he had never been convicted of such a charge. Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court seems to recognize only two types of constitutional privacy claims:
those based on unreasonably intrusive searches, and those involving state regulation of intimate per-
sonal activities and decisions. Control-of-personal-information privacy is ignored. The decision is
inconsistent with the cases discussed in the text and may be an aberration.
170. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
171. The state court decisions have generally upheld state information systems. See, e.g., Volh-
men v. Miller, 52 App. Div. 2d 146, 383 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1976) (computer bank data on all mental
health patients of state clinics held valid); Matter of Schulman v. New York City Health & Hosp.
Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 234. 379 N.Y.S.2d 702, 342 N.E.2d 501 (1975) (state computer bank for data on
all abortions held valid); Industrial Foundation v. Texas Indus. Acc. Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.
1976) (files of workmen's compensation claims not protected from disclosure per se; case remanded
for ad hoc determination as to which files contained information too personal to reveal). See also
Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Gray, 480 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1973) (FBI examination of bank
account of war protest group held valid); Association of Am. Physicians and Surgeons v. Wein-
berger, 395 F.'Supp. 125 (M.D. Il. 1975) (Professional Standards Review Law requiring reports by
physician regarding their cases held valid).
The few states that have adopted explicit constitutional provisions dealing with the right of privacy
may be willing to go further in protecting such interests than the Supreme Court. See, e.g,. Ravin v.
State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alas. 1975) (prohibition of marijuana use in one's home unconstitutional);
White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 533 P.2d 222 (1975) (undercover police surveil-
lance of university classes unconstitutional). Again, no cases with real estate information have been
found.
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The implications of these decisions for secrecy in real estate are not
easy to divine. With respect to ownership information, which has tradi-
tionally been a matter of public record in the United States, it is doubtful
that any constitutional barrier exists to widespread governmental data col-
lection and disclosure. Information about condition and quality of realty
is another matter. One might argue that if sufficiently detailed, it would
reveal too much about the owner or occupant's activities, associations,
and beliefs, to paraphrase Justice Powell's concurrence in California
Bankers. 172 No generalization seems possible, however. Decisions ad-
judicating the constitutionality of governmental systems that collect such
information are likely to turn on the nature of the data sought, the
strength of the public objectives to be served, and the extent of confiden-
tiality or publicity given the information assembled.
E. Statutory Controls on Government Disclosures
In addition to the constitutional inhibitions on governmental informa-
tion systems, both federal and state statutes may either limit or mandate
governmental action to disclose publicly certain information about real
property which it possesses. Such legislation, however, is typically
applicable only to the disclosure phase of an information system's opera-
tion and has no bearing on the processes of information collection, as-
sembly, and storage so long as public divulgence is not involved.
At the federal level, two statutes are of importance: The Freedom of
Information Act 173 and the Privacy Act of 1974.174 The basic thrust of
the FOIA is to grant public access to information possessed by the gov-
ernment, but it contains a number of exemptions 175 under which an
agency can refuse to deliver the requested material. 176 Several of these
exemptions might occasionally cover information regarding ownership or
qualities of real estate.
Exemption 4 specifically excludes "trade secrets and commercial or
financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confiden-
tial." 177 Exemption 9 excludes "geological and geophysical informa-
172. See text accompanying note 150 supra.
173. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
174. Id. § 552a.
175. Id. § 552(b).
176. The Act specifically limits nondisclosure to the exemptions listed in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). Id. §
552(c). The courts have consistently read these exemptions narrowly to maximize government disclo-
sure. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 424 U.S. 352 (1976); Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820
(1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47 (1973).
177. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976).
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tion and data, including maps, concerning wells." 178 The legislative
history of the .FOIA reveals that exemption 9 was prompted by energy
industry fears that confidential information provided to the government by
oil and gas producers would not fall under the ambit of exemption 4,
trade secrets. 179
In Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 180 however, those fears were some-
what allayed. The court there held that although the FPC might compel
disclosure of intrastate sales activities by natural gas companies, such
information was privileged from disclosure within the meaning of exemp-
tion 4. T11 The court reasoned that although such information was not
specifically a trade secret, it was nonetheless (a) commercial or financial,
(b) obtained from a person, and (c) privileged and confidential. 18 The
privilege against disclosure thus arose not out of any privacy interest in-
herent in the ownership or interest in real property, but rather out of the
commercial and competitive value of such information.
A similar result was reached in Pennzoil Co. v. FPC, 183 in which the
agency ordered a number of natural gas companies to file detailed reports
on their holdings of gas reserves, and proposed to make them public. The
companies resisted the order on the ground that the reports fell under
FOIA exemptions 4 (trade secrets) and 9 (geological information concern-
ing wells). The agency did not dispute that the exemptions were applic-
able.' 84 Nonetheless, the court concluded that the agency might still
disclose the information upon a finding that the public interest "out-
weighed" the privacy interest in nondisclosure.1 85 Thus, the privilege
against disclosure found under exemptions 4 and 9 is not absolute.
Rather, it is conditioned upon a balancing of the competitive interest
in confidentiality and the public interest.
Exemption (b)(6) may also, in certain circumstances, apply to privacy
interests incident to real property ownership. It excludes from disclosure
"personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy." 186 To the extent that governmental files "similar" to personnel
178. Id. § 552(b)(9).
179. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2418, 2428.
180. 519 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1975).
181. Id. at 35.
182. Id.
183. 534 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1976).
184. Id. at 630 n.2.
185. Id.
186. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976).
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or medical files contain information on interests in real property, that
information may be protected from disclosure.
The terms of the exemption are obviously broad and are not self-
defining. The mechanism by which a court is expected to distinguish
between exempt and nonexempt files is scarcely clear and has been the
subject of wide critical dispute.' 87 Some guidance, however, is provided
by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Department of the Air Force v.
Rose. 188 Law review students at New York University, preparing a
study of the constitutionality of disciplinary proceedings in military
academies, requested copies of the summaries prepared by the Air Force
Academy of student honor and ethics hearings. The summaries were read-
ily available to the Department and fairly widely disseminated within the
Academy itself,' 8 9 and the requesters stipulated that the summaries
should be delivered with names and other personally identifying matter
deleted. Upon the agency's refusal, the requesters filed a suit under the
FOIA.
In upholding the plaintiffs' claim, the Court analyzed, inter alia, the
agency's defense under the privacy language of exemption 6. It held that
the requested summaries were indeed files "similar" to medical and per-
sonnel records since, if disclosed, they raised the risk that the disciplined
cadets could be exposed "to lifelong embarrassment, perhaps disgrace, as
well as practical disabilities, such as loss of employment or friends." 190
Moreover, "similar files" were intended to be treated by the courts under
precisely the same standards as "medical and personnel files." Yet the
Court found a strong expression of congressional policy favoring disclo-
sure in the statute's statement that the exemption would apply only if
disclosure was "clearly unwarranted." In light of the proposed procedure
under which the district court would review each summary and eliminate
personal references to the cadets, the Court concluded that disclosure was
not "clearly unwarranted," and held for the plaintiffs. In so doing, the
Court was explicitly influenced by the fact that the summaries were not
held highly confidential within the Academy. Thus, it weighed the rather
slight potential personal harm that might accrue to affected cadets from
187. Note, Freedom of Information Act-The Parameters of the Exemptions, 62 GEO. L.J. 177
(1973); Note, Invasion of Privacy and the Freedom of Information Act: Getman v. NLRB, 40 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 527 (1972); Comment, The Freedom of Information Act's Privacy Exemption and
the Privacy Act of 1974, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 596 (1976); Project, Government Informa-
tion and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971, 1078-85 (1975).
188. 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
189. They were customarily posted on 40 squadron bulletin boards and distributed to faculty and
administration officials. Id. at 355.
190. Id. at 376-77.
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disclosure against the strong congressional intent to open public business
to the public view and found the former interest insufficient. In favoring
disclosure, the Court did not explicitly weigh the social utility or value of
the use the plaintiffs proposed to make of the information. Whether doing
so is appropriate is a matter of controversy that Rose does not clearly
resolve. 191
There is, of course, an uncomfortable lack of precision in this deci-
sion. Reasonable minds can differ about the extent of the risk that indi-
vidual cadets might be stigmatized as a result of disclosure; both Justice
Blackmun's and Chief Justice Burger's dissents concluded that this risk
far outweighed the interest of the plaintiffs in disclosure. 192  Yet the
process of weighing the intrusiveness of the information is rather clearly
called for by the statute, and the Court cannot be faulted for undertaking
it.
At least two cases involving exemption 6 concern information about
real property. The most intriguing is Robles v. EPA, 193 in which the
plaintiffs sought release of an EPA survey of the levels of radioactivity in
some 15,000 private and public buildings in Grand Junction, Colorado,
which had been built on fill composed in part of tailings from a uranium
processing plant. The EPA resisted disclosure, arguing that such informa-
tion was "similar" to medical and personnel files and hence exempt
since it had a bearing on the personal health of the occupants of the
buildings. The court conceded the existence of some relevance to health,
but nevertheless ordered disclosure on the ground that it was not "clearly
unwarranted" by privacy considerations. The court treated as irrelevant
the merits of the plaintiffs' proposed use of the data. 194 Following much
the same path as the Supreme Court in Rose, it noted that the information
was already in the hands of the Colorado Department of Health, which
had followed without objection a policy of disclosing such information on
specific property to anyone requesting it. Thus, the further invasion of
privacy that would result from the requested disclosure seemed minor.
191. Compare Comment, The Freedom of Information Act's Privacy Exemption and the Privacy
Act of 1974, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 596, 611-18 (1976) with K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 3A.4 (Supp. 1970) and Note, Invasion of Privacy and the Freedom of Information
Act, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527 (1972).
Chief Justice Burger's dissent indicates that he considered the utility of the plaintiff's proposed use
of the material and found it wanting. He stated, "It is indeed difficult to attribute to Congress a
willingness to subject an individual citizen to the risk of possible severe damage to his reputation
simply to permit law students to invade individual privacy to prepare a law journal article." 425
U.S. at 384.
192. 425 U.S. at 382.
193. 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973).
194. See sources cited note 180 supra.
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Material of considerably greater sensitivity was sought in Rural Hous-
ing Alliance v. United States Department of Agriculture. 1,95 The agency
had prepared a study of possible racial discrimination in its rural housing
program in two Florida counties. Much of the material was collected in
the form of "case studies" that were derived from in-depth interviews
with rural families and included information on their financial status,
property ownership, medical history, pregnancies, family fights, and
other intimate matters. The court had no difficulty concluding that these
reports were "similar" to medical and personnel files. It remanded the
case to the district court for a determination as to whether enough iden-
tifying material could be deleted from the files to avoid a "clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy." It is doubtful that the court would
have been so troubled by the disclosure if only matters relating to real
property had been included in the files.
In these cases the courts clearly demonstrate a bias in favor of disclo-
sure when the government's defense is based on the invasion of privacy.
They are quite willing to engage in ad hoc weighing of the privacy in-
terest and to review the material in as much detail as is needed to delete
particularly intimate or identifying items. This sort of review and reduc-
tion would probably be unnecessary in most cases exclusively involving
real estate information, for its disclosure would rarely approach the
"clearly unwarranted" standard.
FOIA exemption under 4, 6, or 9 is therefore not absolute-even
when the material sought clearly falls within an exemption, agencies and
courts must engage in a balancing of the respective interests to ascertain
whether disclosure is warranted. 196 In one category of cases, however,
the problem of balancing is further compounded by the interaction of the
FOIA and the Privacy Act of 1974.'9' The Privacy Act broadly pro-
hibits release by federal agencies of any "item, collection, or grouping of
information about an individual" 1'8 if the file is retrieved by the use of
the subject's name or other identifying number or symbol. The Privacy
Act contains a specific exemption for material that agencies must release
under the FOIA. 199 Thus, on its face it does not change the law with
195. 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
196. See Pennzoil Co. v. FPC, 534 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1976), discussed in text accompanying
notes 183-85 supra; see also Comment, Protection from Government Disclosure -The Reverse FOIA
Suit, 1976 DUKE L.J. 330.
197. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976).
198. Id. § 552a(a)(4). The subject of the file may, however, give his consent to its release. Id. §
552a(b).
199. Id. § 552a(b)(2).
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regard to the ability of members of the public to compel disclosure. But
since the advent of the Privacy Act, an agency voluntarily or mistakenly
releasing data that is exempt from the FOIA may well subject itself to
civil liability if the data is sufficiently personal to fit the Privacy Act
definition quoted above. A Privacy Act plaintiff may recover costs, attor-
ney's fees, and actual damages, which could be substantial. 20 0
Prior to 1974, agencies could always obviate the risk of litigation by
acquiescing in the request for the information. This is no longer so. A
decision either way by the agency can give rise to a suit, and the risk of
disclosure may seem greater than the risk of withholding, since a Privacy
Act judgment can include damages. The probable result is that agencies
will be increasingly reluctant to release files that are related to specific
individuals, however innocuous the personal references in them may
be ".2" 1  Information regarding real estate will quite commonly be related
in the file to the name of its owner and, in such cases, would appear to
be covered by the Privacy Act. The agency asked to release such data
could presumably do so safely only by expurgating names and other iden-
tifying data in every case. In situations like that in Robles v. EPA, 202 for
example, the agency would probably be even more resistant to disclosure
after the advent of the Privacy Act than before.
A large majority of the states have enacted legislation similar to the
FOIA, 2 3 and at least two have passed statutes comparable to the Privacy
Act as well. 20 4  Even prior to this legislative activity, much of which has
been quite recent, a fairly well-recognized common law right to access to
public records existed, 205 but the cases were sparse and often defined
200. Id. § 552ag)14). Under the 1974 FOIA amendments, an FOIA plaintiff may also be awarded
cost% and attorney's fees, but not damages. Id. § 552(a)(4)(E).
201. See Comment, The Freedom of Information Act's Privacy Exemption and the Privacy Act of
1974, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 597, 627-31 (1976).
202. See note 193 & accompanying text supra.
203. See Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971,
1163 n. 1169 (1975) (listing 43 statutes) [hereinafter cited as MICH. PROJECT].
204. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 15.162-.A68 (West Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-50-1 to
-10 (Supp. 1975); see MICH. PROJECT, supra note 203, at 1266-69; Comment, Informational Pri-
vacy and Public Records, 8 PAC. L.J. 25 (1977) (discussing the vetoed California Information Prac-
tices Act). These statutes should not be confused with recent enactments in a few states, sometimes
termed "privacy acts," which merely codify or vary the existing tort of invasion of privacy. See,
e.g., Note, The Massachusetts Right of Privacy Statute: Decoy or Ugly Duckling?, 9 SUFFOLK L.
REV. 1248 (1975). Numerous state statutes also protect individual privacy with respect to specific
types of public records, such as adoption, arrest, parole, motor vehicles, education, taxation, and
welfare. See MICH. PROJECT, supra note 203, at 1242-77.
205. H. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW 55-56 (1953); MICH. PROJECT, supra note
203, at 1163-67.
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"public records" narrowly to include only records required by law to be
kept.206 Even in states with FOIA-type legislation, the common law
right to access may still exist and may offer an alternative theory for a
plaintiff.2"' The statutory provisions vary from state to state, and
generalization is difficult. They typically contain lists of exemptions simi-
lar to those in the FOIA; an exemption relating to invasions of personal
privacy is common.20 8 Several state acts, unlike the FOIA, include a
"residual" exemption, permitting a court to withhold access in any case
in which the public interest in keeping the material confidential clearly
exceeds the public interest in its disclosure.2 09 This sort of language
seems to authorize consideration by the court of the plaintiff's proposed
use of the information, a matter that is still unsettled under federal
law.2 10  Both the privacy and residual exemptions found in state statutes
necessitate a weighing of the seriousness of invasion of privacy that may
result from disclosure of personal data, and the decisions thus far follow
the same general pattern as the federal cases already discussed. 211  No
state cases involving information regarding real property have been
found, however.
III. COMPELLING DISCLOSURE BY LAND OWNERS
The foregoing discussion has dealt with the potential liability to the
landowner of persons, whether in a private or governmental capacity,
206. See, e.g., Amos v. Gunn, 84 Fla. 285, 94 So. 615 (1922); cf. International Union, UAW v.
Gooding, 251 Wis. 362, 29 N.W.2d 730 (1947) ("public records" defined as all papers required to
be kept and all writings made by public officer within his authority and in discharge of his official
duties). Even under a few modem statutes the same narrow definition of public records prevails. See
MICH. PROJECT, supra note 203, at 1166-67.
207. The New York statute, for example, expressly preserves pre-existing common law rights.
N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 88.10 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
208. The wording of the privacy exemption varies widely; some use the FOIA phrase "clearly
unwarranted." See MICH. PROJECT, supra note 203, at 1172-73 nn.1218, 1219.
209. See Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, 39 Cal. App. 3d 900, 907, 114 Cal. Rptr. 725, 729
(1974); Yarish v. Nelson, 27 Cal. App. 3d 893, 902, 104 Cal. Rptr. 205, 212 (1972); MICH.
PROJECT, supra note 203, at 1174 n.1225.
210. See note 191 & accompanying text supra.
211. In Industrial Foundation v. Texas Indus. Ace. Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976), the Foun-
dation sought access under the Texas Open Records Act to workmen's compensation claims files held
by the Board. Unlike the FOIA, the Act contained no explicit privacy exemption, but it did exempt
information deemed confidential by constitutional law. In a careful opinion, the court held that the
files sought were not generally of such a personal or intimate nature as to be confidential under the
U.S. Constitution. It refused to consider the purpose to which the Foundation intended to put the
files (which allegedly was to assist its employer members in screening out job applicants who had
previously filed claims) and granted disclosure, subject to in camera review and redaction by the trial
court of any particular files that the Board found to contain highly personal or embarrassing informa-
tion.
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who obtain information about the owner's title or the qualities of his land
and reveal it to others. We turn now to a more direct approach: under
what circumstances does the law compel the owner himself to inform
others concerning his land? It seems clear that the federal, and possible
state, constitutional limitations analyzed in Part II will be equally applic-
able here. If government, by statute or court decision, obligates an owner
to make disclosures that intrude on his constitutionally protected zone of
privacy, the presence of state or federal action and the consequent trigger-
ing of the Bill of Rights or, if a state is involved, the fourteenth amend-
ment seems obvious. Government cannot compel the owner to give up
directly what it could not take from him. The content of the constitutional
limitations will not be reviewed in detail in this part, but should be borne
in mind.
Analysis of compelled disclosure may be subdivided along several di-
mensions: federal versus state governmental actions, legislative versus
judicial directives to disclose, and disclosures respecting title and owner-
ship versus those that pertain to the quality or physical characteristics of
the realty. There is no vast body of law in most of these areas, for
governmental action compelling disclosure has been less than vigorous
for the most part. The discussion that follows will first consider title and
ownership disclosures and then disclosures concerning physical attributes
of land.
A. Disclosing Ownership
As already noted, 212 nearly everyone who owns any interest in land
places in the public records some document evidencing that interest. Fail-
ure to do so raises the risk, under American recording statutes, that sub-
sequent purchasers or creditors of a previous owner may deprive the
present claimant of his title. But it is equally true that the recorded
document, in order to provide the protection the present owner desires,
need not disclose his name or identify him in any way. Instead, a trustee,
nominee, corporation, or other "artificial" entity may be interposed as
legal title-holder. Its relationship with the beneficial owner may then be
represented by an off-the-record agreement that the intermediary may de-
cline to disclose in detail to anyone else. In this fashion the beneficial
owner's identity can readily be concealed from the world.
Such a procedure is valid nearly everywhere in the United States. In-
deed, one who proposes to write a rule to pierce this veil and make the
212. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
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beneficial owner's identity public is immediately struck by the complexity
of the task. It is obviously not enough simply to say that every trustee,
for example, must report or set forth in each recorded conveyance the
names of the beneficiaries of his trust. It is all too common for the
beneficiaries themselves to be artificial entities-other trusts, corpora-
tions, or the like-with several levels of such entities possible before one
reaches the natural persons who benefit from the ownership. 213 In addi-
tion, the draftsman must consider whether his real concern is with control
of the land's use or with receipt of its economic benefits, for the two
attributes may readily be allocated to different natural persons in a trust.
The possibility of shareholder voting agreements, long-term leases, the
issuance of debt with conversion privileges or other equity-like charac-
teristics, and installment sale contracts must also be considered, for each
of these tools has the capacity to disguise what amounts to a transfer of
some degree of beneficial interest. Finally, the draftsman must consider
the problem of changes in ownership of the beneficial interests over time,
even though the legal title remains static. If current information is de-
sired, it will do little good merely to require disclosures by artificial en-
tities at the time they acquire the land in question; the data could become
obsolete overnight.
The rulemaking obstacles are formidable, and the result might well be
so unwieldy that it could scarcely be justified by the supposed benefits to
the public of the knowledge thus obtained. Nonetheless, three states (Il-
linois, Iowa and Arizona), which have adopted comprehensive statutes
aimed at public disclosure of beneficial interests in real estate, have met
with varying degrees of success. The three statutes vary markedly, prob-
ably because the legislatures that enacted them were concerned about
three unrelated political issues. In Illinois the statutes seem to have
stemmed from legislative apprehension over slum housing problems and
corruption among public officials. 2 14 Iowa's law was a response to pub-
lic concern over increasing foreign investment in farm land. 2 15  In
Arizona, the fear that organized crime would become entrenched in the
state prompted action.2 16
213. Zumbach & Harl, Anonymity and Disclosure in Ownership Reporting Systems, in U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN U.S. REAL ESTATE 320 (1976), also re-
printed in 8 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES app. L, at L-141 (1976).
214. See Garrett, Legal Aspects of Land Trusts, 35 CHI. B. REC. 445 (1954); Feature, The Il-
linois Land Trust-Shroud with a Silver Lining?, 5 Loy. CHI. L.J. 412 (1974).
215. See Currie, Boehlje, Harl, & Harris, Foreign Investment in Iowa Farmland, and Harl, The
Iowa Reporting Law and Alien Ownership, both reprinted in 8 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES app. L, at L-29, L-164 (1976).
216. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1976, at 20, col. 4.
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In Illinois the legislature has moved only tentatively to require disclo-
sure of the identities of land trust beneficiaries. Its first enactment, in
1963, requires land trustees and managing agents to disclose to local
governments the "identity of every owner and beneficiary with an in-
terest in present use and enjoyment" within ten days after receiving a
notice or complaint of violation of any ordinance "relating to conditions
or operations of real property affecting health or safety." 217 The appar-
ent intent was to force disclosure of the owners of buildings with hous-
ing code violations.2 18  A penalty of $100 per day is provided, and the
statute would appear to be reasonably effective within its limited sphere,
although it spells out no specific procedure to compel the required disclo-
sure.
In 1969 the Illinois legislature added two other disclosure provisions.
One applies to sales of residential buildings of six units or fewer by
means of installment contracts with payments spread over more than five
years. In such cases the contract is voidable at the buyer's option unless
the beneficiaries of the land trust selling the property are identified in and
sign the contract. 21 9  The coverage of this provision is obviously quite
limited. Moreover, it seems defective in that it applies only to "ben-
eficiaries" rather than to persons "with a present interest in use or en-
joyment" as in the code violation statute. The latter phrase would seem
to cover beneficiaries of subsidiary trusts, persons holding executory con-
tractual rights to purchase beneficial interests, persons holding through
nominees as beneficiaries, 220 and the like. Neither language, however,
covers corporate or other nontrust arrangements by which ownership
might be concealed.
Illinois' third statute, also enacted in 1969, requires any land trustee or
managing agent who enters into a contract with any governmental entity
regarding the ownership or use of land to disclose in writing "the identity
of every owner and beneficiary having any interest, real or personal, in
217. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, § 81 (1971).
218. See Feature, The Illinois Land Trust-Shroud with a Silver Lining?, 5 LoY. CHI. L.J. 412,
420 (1974).
219. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, § 8.31-.32 (Supp. 1977). It is interesting that the Illinois legisla-
ture took this step only with respect to vendors under long-term installment contracts. Such contracts
have been a serious problem in transfers of inner-city property in the Chicago area. See Clark v.
Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974). Yet, the
purchaser's need to know is not confined to installment contracts but is equally important in other
types of vendor-financed sales. It is also important, though to a lesser extent, in cash sales insofar as
claims on warranties of quality or misrepresentation are actionable.
220. Cf. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148, § 106 (Supp. 1977) (authorizing trustees to hold trust prop-
erty in the name of a nominee with no mention in the recorded document of the trust's existence).
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such property." 221 Again, nontrust arrangements are not covered, but
presumably indirect or layered trust interests would be included. The sta-
tute enjoins the courts to construe it liberally to require "identification of
the actual parties benefitting" from the transaction. Strangely, the penalty
provisions apply only to public officeholders, but since the statute by its
terms imposes the duty to disclose solely on the trustee, it is not clear
how any public official could be in violation unless he were also the
trustee-an improbable situation. Another weakness of the statute is its
failure to cover noncontractual dealings with land by local government
officials, such as rezonings, assessment liens, and other decisions that
can substantially affect land value. 22 2
Numerous bills have been introduced recently in the Illinois legislature
to expand the disclosure duties of land trustees.2 23  They have varied
widely in scope, but none have been enacted. Since most of these bills
would have left the nonsecrecy advantages of land trusts, such as ease of
transfer, unimpaired, it is apparent that secrecy itself is seen by the legis-
lators as attractiye and worthy of preservation. Legislation, however, is
not the only way the veil of secrecy might be pierced; conceivably courts
could require disclosure as well. The Illinois courts have shown no in-
terest in holding secrecy to violate public policy.22 4 If, however, litiga-
tion arose in which the identity of the beneficiaries of a land trust were
relevant, the ordinary processes of civil discovery would presumably be
available to uncover them, with support from a judicial order if neces-
sary. 225 Still, this approach is costly, requires filing a complaint, and
may not be appropriate in many circumstances. Illinois thus remains
without any comprehensive law mandating disclosure of beneficial own-
ership.
Iowa's legislative concerns, and its disclosure requirements, differ rad-
ically from those of Illinois. The state has a long history of statutory
hostility to land ownership by nonresident aliens. 2 26 Under Iowa law, a
221. Id. ch. 102, §§ 3.1, 4 (Supp. 1977).
222. But see United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 424 U.S. 976
(1976) (city councilman who acquired tax delinquent parcels through land trust and obtained city
action discharging assessment liens, found guilty of mail fraud).
223. See Elliott, The Proposed Land Trust Act, 63 ILL. B.J. 254 (1975); Note, Land Trust Se-
crecy-Perhaps a Secret No More, 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 509, 512-16 (1973).
224. See, e.g., Chicago Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Cacciatore, 25 11. 2d 535, 185 N.E.2d 670
(1962).
225. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, § 201 (1968 & Supp. 1977).
226. See Note, Property Rights of Aliens Under Iowa and Federal Law, 47 IowA L. REV. 105
(1961). Restrictions on land ownership by nonresident aliens are not uncommon among American
states. See sources cited note 228 infra.
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nonresident alien may not own more than 640 acres located outside the
corporate limits of a town or city. 227 Both foreign corporations and
United States corporations, half of whose stock is controlled by nonresident
aliens, are similarly restricted. These provisions are open to constitutional
attack, but the outcome of such litigation is uncertain.
228
Presumably as a means of enforcing these restrictions on alien owner-
ship, and as a way of quantifying the extent of land acquisition by non-
resident aliens, the Iowa legislature in 1975 added a reporting provision
that requires every nonresident alien who owns or leases agricultural land
or engages in farming outside the corporate limits of any city in Iowa to
file an annual report identifying the owner of the land, the type of ag-
riculture, the size and location of the land, the types and amounts of
livestock and crops, and the amount of land leased. 229 Finally, the stat-
ute provides, "The nonresident shall also disclose whether such nonresi-
dent alien is represented in Iowa by an agent or other representative and,
if so represented, the name of the individual or firm acting in such capac-
ity." 23u The substantive prohibition on nonresident alien ownership in
Iowa speaks of "acquiring title to or holding" real estate. 2 31 It is un-
clear whether indirect ownership, as through a nominee or a land trust, is
prohibited, and there seem to be no judicial decisions on the point. The
language of the reporting statute, "owning or leasing," is equally am-
biguous. If such indirect ownership is covered, then the reporting statute
quoted above may well compel disclosure of the trust or nominee rela-
tionship, since it may constitute "represent [ation] . . . by an agent."
Arguably this aspect of the statute will pierce any number of layers of
trusts, contracts, or the like to expose the individual nonresident alien.
But whether this is the real intent of the statute is admittedly speculative.
Assuming that the statute will operate to disclose beneficial interests in
this manner, it is instructive to compare it with the Illinois legislation.
Reporting of such interests in Illinois is keyed to specific events: a code
violation complaint, an installment contract sale, or a contract with a
local governmental body. 23 2  By contrast, the Iowa statute requires an-
nual reporting to the secretary of state whether or not any event of in-
227. IowA CODE ANN. § 567.1 (West Supp. 1977).
228. See generally Lowe, The Arizona Alien Land Law: Its Meaning and Constitutional Validity,
1976 ARIZ. ST. L. REV. 253 (1976); Morrison, Limitations on Alien Investment in American Real
Estate, 60 MINN. L. REV. 621 (1976); Note Foreign Direct Investment in United States Real Estate:
Xenophobic or Principled Reaction? 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 491 (1976).
229. IOWA CODE ANN. § 567.9 (West Supp. 1977).
230. Id. § 567.9(5).
231. Id. § 567.1.
232. See notes 217-22 & accompanying text supra.
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terest has occurred since the previous report. Of course, the Iowa statute
has a very limited scope, since the amount of land in the state owned by
nonresident aliens is probably miniscule. 2 33 The Iowa provision over-
comes one important defect of the Illinois law by providing a specific
form and procedure for reporting, but it is weaker than Illinois law in
another respect; it mentions no penalty whatever for noncompliance.
In Arizona, concern has grown in recent years over the increasing
economic power of organized crime, particularly in the fields of land
ownership and development.234 It has been widely believed that one
way to circumvent this trend was to "outlaw secret trusts"--that is, to
require disclosure of beneficiaries. 235  To accomplish this, the Arizona
legislature enacted, as an amendment to the recording statute, a broad
provision requiring that in every conveyance to or from a trustee or other
person acting in a representative capacity, language must be included giv-
ing the names and addresses of the beneficiaries or persons represented
and identifying the trust or other agreement or referring to the book and
page in the public records at which it appears. 236  For trusts and other
arrangements already in existence on the statute's effective date, the trus-
tee or other representative was given 120 days within which to record an
affidavit giving the same information. 237
In one respect-the types of arrangements covered-the Arizona stat-
ute is certainly more comprehensive than those of Iowa or Illinois. It is
difficult to imagine any type of nominee or representative relationship
that is not included. Even so, the status of the "shell corporation" as a
land-holding device seems not to be covered. Perhaps the Arizona courts
will distinguish between corporations that are passive real estate owners
and those that engage in some active business, but the statute provides no
guidance on this point. In other respects, the new law is even more con-
fusing. What does it mean to "identify" a trust? Is it sufficient to give a
trust number, or must the text of the trust agreement appear? Is it re-
quired that natural persons be the listed beneficiaries, or may the name of
233. A 1975 survey to which 511 real estate brokers in Iowa responded indicated that only 65 had
even heard of a transaction or inquiry involving a foreign investor. Many of these were duplicates,
and the investigators were able to document only 10 transactions. Currie, Boehlje, Harl. & Harris.
Foreign Investment in Iowa Farmland, reprinted in 8 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN DI-
RECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, app. L. at L-29 (1976).
234. The murder of investigative reporter Don Bolles while working on a story on this subject
moved the matter to national attention. See, e.g., Trial is Ordered for Dog Owner in Bombing
Murder of Reporter, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1976, at 12, col. 1.
235. See Millions in Arizona Land Frauds Alleged, id., Mar. 30, 1975, § 1, at 20, col. 4.
236. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 33-401(C) (Supp. 1977).
237. Id. § 33-401(D)-(E).
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another trustee, a corporation, or a nominee be given as the beneficiary
of the trust in question? None of these matters is clearly addressed.
The Arizona statute, like that of Illinois, is "event-based," but here
the event that triggers disclosure is the transfer of land to or from the
representative. Apparently occurrences after the conveyance of legal title,
such as changes in beneficiaries or modifications in the terms of the trust
agreement, need not be disclosed, though this seems an obvious tech-
nique for evasion of the law's objective.
The statute's penalties for noncompliance are strange as well. For fail-
ure of existing representatives to file affidavits within 120 days of the
effective date, severe criminal penalties are provided.2 38 Nevertheless,
for future transfers that fail to include the necessary disclosures, the only
sanction is that the transfer "shall be voidable." The meaning of "void-
able" in this context is uncertain. One possibility is that the transaction
may be rescinded at the option of the innocent party-the one not acting
in a representative capacity. This may make some sense in the case of a
transfer to a representative, but it is obviously meaningless in most cases
of transfers from representatives since the transferee will usually have no
desire to avoid the transaction. In either circumstance, the sanction seems
highly arbitrary and uncertain. An alternative reading of "voidable," and
one that seems slightly more consistent with the placement of the statute
in the article on recording, is that the noncomplying conveyance is
treated as giving no constructive notice for purposes of the recording act.
Hence, the grantor may reconvey the same property to another grantee
free of any effect from the prior conveyance; in effect, the document is
deemed unrecorded. Again, this view makes sense only when the guilty
representative is the grantee; if he is the grantor, giving him the power to
deprive his original, and presumably innocent, grantee of title by a sec-
ond deed is a strange way to punish him for neglecting to make the
required disclosures.
Despite its apparent comprehensiveness, the Arizona statute is a draft-
ing bungle. It lends weight to the conclusion that no jurisdiction in the
United States has come to grips with the issue of mandatory disclosure of
beneficial ownership of land. The task is certainly not a simple one and
should not be undertaken without sensitivity both to the costs that any
type of reporting system will entail 239 and to the manifold methods of
evasion that ingenious counsel may invent to protect the secrecy of their
238. Id. § 33-401(F).
239. See Zumbach & Harl, supra note 213 at 321. The authors also analyze the potential for a
federal disclosure requirement. Id. at 329-31.
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clients. It is clear, however, that the issue deserves a much better effort
than any legislature has given thus far.
B. Financial Disclosure Laws for Public Officials
Concern about conflicts of interest among public officials, mentioned
above in connection with the Illinois land trust statutes, 240 has surfaced in
recent years in a much broader fashion. By 1975 some sixteen states had
adopted legislation requiring disclosure by public officials of various
types of financial data, 241 and in several other states a similar result has
been accomplished by executive order.242 These disclosure rules vary in
coverage, and many include interests in real property. 243  Again it is
often unclear whether beneficial interests in trusts, corporations, or other
land-holding entities are included, but there is a substantial chance of the
courts so holding. 2
44
Attacks on the constitutionality of these disclosure requirements have
been mounted in several cases. In City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 45
the California Supreme Court struck down the California statute, which
included real estate not used for personal or recreational purposes, on
grounds of invasion of privacy. The court concluded that the statute was
too intrusive to be justified by its admittedly valid governmental objec-
tive.2 46  A revised and somewhat narrowed statute, however, was ap-
240. See notes 219-22 & accompanying text supra.
241. Note, Fighting Conflicts of Interest in Officialdom: Constitutional and Practical Guidelines
for State Financial Disclosure Laws, 73 MICH. L. REV. 758, at 758 n.5 (1975).
242. See Illinois State Empl. Ass'n v. Walker, 57 Iil. 2d 512, 315 N.E.2d (1974), cert. denied sub
nom. Troopers Lodge No. 41 v. Walker, 419 U.S. 1058 (1974); Evans v. Carey, 53 App. Div. 2d
109, 385 N.Y.S.2d 965, aff'd mem., 40 N.Y.2d 1008, 391 N.Y.S.2d 393, 359 N.E.2d 983 (1976).
243. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-76 (Supp. 1977); HAW. REV. STAT. § 84-17
(Supp. 1977); cf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-16-7 (Supp. 1977) (public official required to disclose
only any substantial interest in any business entity that is subject to the regulation of the political
subdivision of which he is an officer).
244. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3625 (West Supp. 1977), which requires disclosure of real
property in which the official has "a direct or indirect interest worth more than one thousand dol-
lars," and which defines indirect interest as:
investment or interest owned by the spouse or dependent children of the public official,
by an agent on his behalf, by any business entity controlled by the public official or by
a trust in which he has a substantial economic interest. A business entity is controlled by
a public official if the public official, agents, spouse or dependent children, possess
more than 50 percent of the ownership interest in the entity. A public official has a
substantial economic interest in a trust, when the official, his spouse or dependent chil-
dren have a present or future interest worth more than one thousand dollars ($1,000).
245. 2 Cal. 3d 249, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970); see Note, Fighting Conflicts of
Interest, supra note 241.
246. See cases discussed at text accompanying notes 147-72 supra.
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proved by the same court in 1974,247 and recent decisions in
Washington, 248 Illinois, 249 and New York 250 have sustained disclosure
requirements in the face of similar attacks. The courts have noted the
considerably broader power of government to intrude on the personal
liberties of its employees than of the public generally, as evidenced by
the U.S. Supreme Court's reaffirmance of the Hatch Act in 1973.2 5 1
Particularly where disclosure requirements are limited to upper-echelon
employees and elected officials having substantial decisionmaking
power, 252 they are unlikely to encounter major constitutional difficulties
in the future. While they run counter to the desire of some landowners
for secrecy, it is improbable that those interested in holding public office
will be greatly deterred by the mandate to disclose.
C. Disclosing Quality or Condition
In recent years, a number of state courts have extended the law of
implied warranties to new housing construction.2513  Tort rules relating to
fraud and concealment also may give rise to duties of disclosure by sel-
lers of realty.25 4  In a sense, both of these bodies of law may be viewed
as mandating disclosure, although failure to comply will impose a sanc-
tion on the seller only if an actual defect in the property gives rise to
damages. Moreover, these tort and warranty rules fail to cover many
situations in which the condition of the property results in a serious fi-
nancial loss to a buyer.2 55  A recognition of these weaknesses, and of
the resulting hardships on purchasers of real estate, led to the enactment
of the Federal Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act in 1968,256 and
to many similar state statutes that require specific and detailed written
247. County of Nevada v. MacMillen, 11 Cal. 3d 662, 522 P.2d 1345, 114 Cal. Rptr. 345
(1974).
248. Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 517 P.2d 911 (1974).
249. Illinois State Empl. Ass'n v. Walker, 57 I11. 2d 512, 315 N.E.2d 9, cert. denied sub nom.
Troopers Lodge No. 41 v. Walker, 419 U.S. 1058 (1974).
250. Evans v. Carey, 53 App. Div. 2d 109, 385 N.Y.S.2d 965, aff'd mem., 40 N.Y.2d 1008,
391 N.Y.S.2d 393, 359 N.E.2d 983 (1976).
251. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 556
(1973).
252. Limitations of this type influenced the court to validate the statute in County of Nevada v.
MacMillen, 11 Cal. 3d 662, 522 P.2d 1345, 114 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1974).
253. See note 15 supra.
254. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 7.14 (1956); W. PROSSER, supra
note 16, § 106 (4th ed. 1971).
255. See notes 15 & 17 supra.
256. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, Title XIV, 82 Stat. 476
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1976)).
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disclosures as a part of the land sales process.257 Yet these laws, too,
are limited in scope. For example, they generally do not apply to im-
proved land or small subdivisions.258 There are still no generally appli-
cable requirements in the United States that owners of land or buildings
disclose their quality or condition, either to prospective purchasers or to
the public at large.
Disclosures about structural quality or condition differ from disclosures
of ownership in an important respect. They require some kind of inspec-
tion of the property to adduce the desired information. The record owner
of real estate will generally have at his fingertips the names and addresses
of those who have beneficial interests in the property. Presumably, he
can report them accurately and with little difficulty if given a legal incen-
tive to do so. But with respect to quality or condition, the owner's state-
ment may not be so reliable. Standards for such matters vary and are
somewhat subjective. The owner's self-interest will usually lead him to
overstate the property's good condition. To solve these problems, inspec-
tion by an independent third party may be a highly desirable element if a
program of disclosure is to yield reliable information. 259 Third-party in-
spections raise additional problems, however. First, should such inspec-
tion be mandatory or permissive? Should governments require a certifi-
cate of inspection prior to sale or would a policy of encouraging the
availability of such services be sufficient? If mandatory, what sanctions
should be available to ensure compliance? Second, who should provide
inspection services: the government, federal or state, or private inspec-
tion companies, perhaps licensed by the appropriate governmental entity?
Finally, there are issues of privacy and cost. If inspection by government
officers is to be mandatory, significant constitutional considerations may
arise. With respect to cost, competing public policy considerations must
be weighed in deciding whether to treat the cost of inspection services as
one to be borne by buyer or seller as part of a private business transac-
tion or to be borne by the general taxpayer as a necessary regulation of
important governmental interests.
257. See Note, Regulation of Interstate Land Sales, 25 STAN. L. REv. 605 (1973).
258. The federal Act, for example, is not applicable to developments containing fewer than 50 lots
or to land on which a residential, commercial or industrial building exists or is to be built within two
years. 15 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1), (3) (1976).
259. In administering the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) does not employ independent inspection. It relies instead on the
developer's information, with investigations by government officials when discrepancies develop. See
24 C.F.R. §§ 1720.45-.100 (1977). HUD has issued numerous citations to developers for violations
of the Act.
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Any proposed program of inspections involves broad public policy
considerations extending beyond the scope of this article. A discussion of
the privacy issue, however, is appropriate here. The Supreme Court dealt
with governmental inspections in Camara v. Municipal Court,260 in
which a residential tenant challenged a city housing code inspector's right
to make an inspection of his building. The Court concluded that the
fourth amendment prohibited warrantless searches in the absence of the
occupant's consent, but it promulgated a relaxed standard of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant to perform a code inspection. Al-
though reasonable legislative and administrative standards must be satis-
fied with respect to the building to be inspected, the Court held that such
standards "may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the
building (e.g., a multi-family apartment house), or the condition of the
entire area, but they will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge
of the condition of the particular dwelling." 261 Apparently, some, but
not much, evidence of probable violation of existing codes is necessary to
obtain a warrant. Of course, in many cases-probably the vast
majority-the occupant will consent to the inspection and no warrant will
be needed.2 6
2
A few jurisdictions have attempted to circumvent the warrant require-
ment by indirection. Currier v. Pasadena 263 involved a city ordinance
requiring that a certificate of occupancy, based on a current code inspec-
tion, be issued each time residential property was transferred. The city
argued that this system did not compel inspection, but sought only to
regulate the relationship between the contracting parties. The court, how-
ever, was unimpressed, noting that the price of privacy exacted by the
ordinance was the loss of a prospective sale and concommitant income.
Although holding this technique to be void on its face with respect to
nonconsenting owners, the court allowed the ordinance to stand upon the
city's stipulation that warrant requirements were to be read into it.
Cincinnati recently adopted an ordinance with broader coverage. Like
Pasadena, it required a certificate of inspection for each residential real
estate transfer. It, however, provided criminal penalties for violations and
included no search warrant procedure for nonconsenting owners. The or-
dinance also required the seller to warrant to the purchaser that the prop-
260. 337 U.S. 523 (1967).
261. Id. at 538; accord, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S.Ct. 1816, 1824 (1978).
262. See Warren, Report of Committee on Building Codes and Fire Prevention Ordinances, 33
NIMLO MUNICIPAL L. REV. 349, 359 (1970).
263. 48 Cal. App. 3d 810, 121 Cal. Rptr. 913, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1000 (1975); see also
Telins v. Municipal Court, 5 Cal. App. 3d 455, 85 Cal. Rptr. 459 (1970).
1978]
HeinOnline  -- 27 Am. U. L. Rev. 305 1977-1978
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
erty complied with the building and zoning codes unless the purchaser
was given a copy of the certificate of inspection or had actual knowledge
of the deficiencies in question at the time of contracting. In Wilson v.
City of Cincinnati,264 the Ohio Supreme Court, relying on Camara, held
the criminal penalties in the ordinance to be void in the absence of a
search warrant clause. The warranty provision was left essentially un-
touched, however, and must be considered a far-reaching step. In es-
sence, it compels the seller either to provide essential information to the
purchaser or to warrant that there is none to provide. Since the warranty
is supported by city code standards of quality and is applicable to both
old and new housing, it is considerably more inclusive than the implied
warranties imposed on builders of new housing in recent years by the
courts. 265
As an alternative solution to the fourth amendment search warrant
problem, a statute or ordinance might shift the burden of obtaining the
inspection to the owner himself. A city or state government could license
private firms to perform such inspections, 266 and the owner could make
his own selection and arrangements. Under such a system the intrusion
caused by inspection would be minimal and claims of unconstitutionality
would be greatly attenuated.
The related issue of who should bear the costs of inspection involves
both public policy and empirical considerations. A threshold question is
whether the social cost of any inspection system can be justified by its
benefits. Clearly the market will function better when information from
inspections is made available, but how much better? How much and what
type of information should be disclosed? If prospective purchasers decide
to obtain their own information, as in the geophysical exploration cases,
and can do so in a nonobtrusive fashion, there is no reason for the law to
bar their way. They can decide for themselves whether the game is worth
the candle. The empirical question of how much disclosure is enough will
itself be answered by the marketplace through prospective purchasers'
willingness to seek additional information at their own expense. This
does not follow, however, if the burden of paying for the information is
imposed on the public through governmental inspection. Here, the balanc-
ing of incentives through the market is replaced by a balancing of public
policy considerations by legislators, administrators, and judges. This
264. 46 Ohio St. 2d 138, 346 N.E.2d 666 (1976).
265. See note 15 supra.
266. Numerous private firms have begun operation in metropolitan areas in recent years, offering
inspections and warranty services to both new and existing housing. See Home Warranties: Accep-
tance Slow, Wash. Post, Feb. 22, 1977, § D, at 1, col. 5.
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issue is raised by the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act 267 as well
as by the municipal inspection statutes just discussed. There is no a priori
way to know whether the benefits of a facilitated market are great enough
to justify the inspection program's costs. Hopefully, the experience of
federal housing programs as well as state and local inspection laws will
provide a framework for a fuller analysis of these issues in the future.
CONCLUSION
An inherent conflict exists between the desire of owners for secrecy
concerning their land and the interests of prospective buyers, government,
and the general public in the availability of information. Although a fully
satisfactory resolution of this conflict ultimately may not be possible, the
general tendency of the law is, and should be, in favor of the free flow
of information.
In cases involving the obtaining and disclosure of true information by a
third party, no right of action should accrue to the landowner unless the
third party's statements are highly intimate or embarrassing-an improb-
able situation when information about land usage, quality, or condition is
involved, and virtually inconceivable when the information concerns land
ownership. This result should follow whether government or a private
third party has made the disclosures. Indeed, it is strongly arguable that
the first amendment requires this degree of freedom from liability for
informants. 268  A third party who gains land-related information, how-
ever, should be subject to a legal duty to share it with the owner.
Cases dealing with the tort right of privacy, injurious falsehood, and
interference with contract or prospective advantage sharply limit the lia-
bility of informants and are generally consistent with the foregoing
suggestions. The law of geophysical exploration, by contrast, has im-
posed liability; these cases may well state an unconstitutional position,
and in any event should be overruled as a matter of policy. Moreover, to
the extent that relevant information concerning land exists in the hands of
federal or state governmental agencies, it should be, and generally has
been, made available by them for the asking under the Freedom of In-
formation Act and similar state statutes unless disclosure would result in
serious invasion of personal privacy or would deprive landowners of trade
secrets.
267. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, Title XIV, 82 Stat. 476
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1976)).
268. See notes 74-84 & accompanying text supra.
1978]
HeinOnline  -- 27 Am. U. L. Rev. 307 1977-1978
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Whether the law should compel landowners themselves to disclose in-
formation about the title or condition of their property is less easy to
decide. With regard to title, it is doubtful that a blanket rule requiring
divulgence of beneficial ownership in all cases is necessary or appro-
priate. It would be better to itemize by statute the situations involving the
public interest. For example, full public disclosure should be required in
all sales or leases to public bodies, and all significant financial and real
estate interests held by high-level public officials should be made public.
In addition, every person who possesses or is acquiring an interest in a
parcel of land should be able to compel, by court order if necessary, a
full disclosure of the identity of all natural persons who hold beneficial
interests in that same land, no matter how those interests may be dis-
guised.2 69 Thus, tenants should have access to the identity of their land-
lords, remaindermen of their life tenants, and purchasers of their ven-
dors. 270  In these and similar situations, the inherent intimacy of the
legal relationships and the possibility of legal claims arising between the
parties fully justify a rule of law that proscribes secrecy.
The same rule should be applied in favor of persons selling land, but
only when a credit sale is involved. Buyers who purchase with cash,
however, should not be required to make such disclosures, since the
seller has much less need for the knowledge if he has been fully paid.
Moreover, a contrary rule would make land assembly for large projects
exorbitantly costly to developers.
Finally, the law should recognize a general right on the part of any
petitioner to obtain a court order compelling disclosure of beneficial own-
ership of land upon a showing of legitimate need that outweighs the own-
er's interest in secrecy, even in situations beyond those outlined above.
This standard is admittedly imprecise, but it is impossible to anticipate all
situations in which disclosure may be desirable. Some judicial discretion
is therefore appropriate.
Compelling owners to disclose information about the condition or qual-
ity of their property is a much more uncertain business, since it intro-
duces factors of cost and intrusion, which inevitably follow if inspection
is required. It seems reasonably clear that vendors of realty should be
liable for the correction of substantial defects of which they had know-
ledge at the time of the sale. As noted above, however, it is not easy to
269. Some limits are obviously necessary when the artificial entity has a large number of benefi-
cial owners. For example, there is little point in making General Motors disclose the names of its
shareholders when it sells parcels of land. Some arbitrary rule seems necessary. Perhaps entities with
more than 20 unrelated members, beneficiaries, or shareholders should be exempt from disclosure.
270. See note 219 supra.
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ascertain whether more far-reaching programs involving systematic in-
spections or disclosures are appropriate from an economic or public pol-
icy standpoint. Experience with existing inspection programs should be
helpful.
Generally, though, if the states are laboratories of democracy, one
must conclude that their experiments in breaking down the barriers of
secrecy in real estate have been haphazard and poorly conceived. In part,
this may be due to the absence of any great political interest in the matter
in most jurisdictions. Yet it is clear that secrecy is often an unjustifiable
impediment to rational governmental policymaking, law enforcement,
public debate, and fair and efficient private markets. More thoughtful and
comprehensive action by the courts and legislatures is needed.
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